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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the possible relationship between the current 
account deficits and financial crises indicators with a comparative perspective 
to European emerging markets. Current account deficits reaching the 
conventional threshold of 5% of GDP (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1996) cause a 
debate regarding the current account positions and the possibility of a crisis. A 
high current account deficit alone is not a message for economic crises. There 
are other macroeconomic indicators that impact the overall economic situation 
of the country and that should be analyzed together with the current account 
position. The interaction of current account deficits with other variables such as 
GDP growth rate, inflation rate change, exports/GDP ratio, net FDI 
inflows/GDP ratio, total external debt/GDP ratio and FX reserves/external debt 
ratio are examined using multiple regression analysis method. The dependent 
variable is CA balance as a percentage of GDP.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı, cari açıklar ve finansal krizler arasındaki olası ilişkiyi, 
Avrupa’daki yükselen piyasalarla karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz etmektir. Cari 
açıklar, geleneksel olarak kabul görmüş oran olan, GSYİH’nın %5 ‘ine denk 
gelen eşiğe (Milesi, Ferretti ve Razin, 1996) ulaştığında, cari işlemler hesabının 
durumu ve kriz olasılığı tartışmalarına sebep olmaktadır. Tek başına yüksek bir 
cari açık kriz göstergesi olarak kabul edilmemelidir. Ülkenin genel ekonomik 
durumunu etkileyen diğer makroekonomik göstergeler de cari işlemler 
hesabının durumuyla beraber analiz edilmelidir. Cari açıkların diğer 
değişkenlerle, örneğin GSYİH büyüme oranı, enflasyon oranı değişimi, net 
doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar akışı/GSYİH oranı, ihracat/GSYİH oranı, toplam 
dış borç/GSYİH oranı ve döviz rezervleri/toplam dış borç oranı etkileşimi, 
çoklu regresyon analizi ile incelenmiştir. Bağımlı değişken, cari işlemler 
dengesinin GSYİH yüzdesi olarak ifadesidir.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor Prof. Dr. Oral 
Erdoğan for his guidance, support and time during the preparation of the study. 
I am thankful to my colleagues for their help and support during my study. 
Last but certainly not least, I would also like to thank my family for their 
endless support and understanding in every step I take. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................ iii 
Özet ....................................................................................................................iv 
Acknowledgments .............................................................................................v 
Table of Contents..............................................................................................vi 
List of Tables.................................................................................................. viii 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................xi 
List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................xii 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON CURRENT ACCOUNT  
    DEFICIT AND ITS SUSTAINABILITY……………………..3 
3. FINANCIAL CRISES.............................................................. 10 
3.1. Economic factors that lead to a financial crisis.................................10 
    3.2. Currency Crises ....................................................................................14 
3.2.1. First Generation Crises...........................................................14 
3.2.2. Second Generation Crises.......................................................16 
3.2.2.1. Contagion...................................................................17 
3.2.2.2. Herd Behavior ...........................................................18 
3.2.3. Third Generation Crises .........................................................18 
    3.3. Banking Crises ......................................................................................19 
    3.4. Early Warning Signals .........................................................................20 
    3.5. Financial Liberalization and Capital Flows.......................................23 
4. DYNAMICS OF FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING    
     MARKETS ...............................................................................28 
4.1. Economic Growth ................................................................................28 
4.1.1. GDP Growth Rate ...................................................................28 
4.1.2. Current Account in Percentage of GDP................................29 
4.2. Liberal Economic Policies ...................................................................29 
              4.2.1. Inflation ....................................................................................29 
4.2.2. Interest Rates ...........................................................................30 
    4.3. Economic Openness..............................................................................30 
4.3.1. Openness to International Finance ........................................31 
4.3.2. Capital Movements..................................................................31 
4.3.3. Exchange Rate Regime............................................................31 
4.3.4. External Trade.........................................................................32 
4.4. Current Account Deficits and Current Account Sustainability ......32 
  
 
vii
5. COUNTRY ANALYSIS ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS AND 
FINANCIAL CRISES.................................................................. 35 
5.1. Bulgaria .....................................................................................................36 
5.2. Czech Republic .........................................................................................38 
5.3. Hungary.....................................................................................................41 
5.4. Romania.....................................................................................................43 
5.5. Russia.........................................................................................................45 
5.6. Slovenia......................................................................................................46 
5.7. Turkey........................................................................................................47 
6. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY ..........................................51 
7. A COMPARISON OF COUNTRY FINDINGS .....................71 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION..........................................................................73 
References ......................................................................................74 
 
APPENDICES ...............................................................................84 
       A.  DATA RELATIVE TO CHAPTER 5 & 6  ....................84 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
viii
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 3.1: Mean Correlations of Monthly Equity Market Returns,  
1970s-1990s.......................................................................................................17 
 
Table 3.2: Significance of Early warning Indicators of Vulnerability to  
Currency Crises .................................................................................................22 
 
Table 3.3: Common Factors of Currency Collapses..........................................23 
 
Table 3.4: Average Lead Time ..........................................................................24 
 
Table 5.1: Bulgaria’s Current Account Position ...............................................37 
 
Table 5.2: Czech Republic’s Current Account Position....................................40 
 
Table 5.3: Hungary’s Current Account Position ...............................................42 
 
Table 5.4: Romania’s Current Account Position...............................................44 
 
Table 5.5: Russia’s Current Account Position...................................................46 
 
Table 5.6: Slovenia’s Current Account Position ...............................................47 
 
Table 5.7: Turkey’s Current Account Position..................................................48 
 
Table 6.1: Tests of Normality for Bulgaria .......................................................53 
 
Table 6.2: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis for Bulgaria…………53 
 
  
 
ix
Table 6.3: Correlation Table for Bulgaria ...........................................................54 
 
Table 6.4: Tests of Normality for Czech Republic..............................................55 
 
Table 6.5: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis for Czech Republic .....56 
 
Table 6.6: Correlation Table for Czech Republic................................................57 
 
Table 6.7: Tests of Normality for Hungary .........................................................58 
 
Table 6.8: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis for Hungary.................58 
 
Table 6.9: Test of Normality for Romania ..........................................................59 
 
Table 6.10: Correlation Table for Hungary .........................................................60 
 
Table 6.11: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis for Romania ..............61 
 
Table 6.12: Correlation Table for Romania.........................................................62 
 
Table 6.13: Tests of Normality for Russia ..........................................................63 
 
Table 6.14: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis for Russia ..................63 
 
Table 6.15: Tests of Normality for Slovenia .......................................................64 
 
Table 6.16: Correlation Table for Russia ............................................................65 
 
Table 6.17: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis for Slovenia...............66 
 
  
 
x
Table 6.18: Correlation Table for Slovenia .........................................................67 
 
Table 6.19: Tests of Normality for Turkey..........................................................68 
 
Table 6.20: Correlation Table for Turkey ...........................................................69 
 
Table 6.21: Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis for Turkey .................70 
 
Table 7.1: Country Comparison of the independent variables ............................72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Sequence of Events in the Emerging Markets  
Financial Crises .................................................................................................13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
xii
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
CAD: Current Account Deficit 
EU: European Union 
EUR: Euro 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment 
FX: Foreign Exchange 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GNI: Gross National Income 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
US: United States 
USD: United States Dollars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Nowadays, financial crises are not only the main problem of the developing 
economies like in 1970s and 1980s debt crises as well as in 1990s banking 
crises, but also of the developed countries like in financial bubbles and credit 
crises. Therefore, the factors of the financial crises have become an important 
subject to analyze economic activity of a country and the developments and 
trends in international finance. One of these factors is the current account 
deficit which is shown as the main dominator of these crises, in fact, this should 
be examined in details, especially since 1990s, the beginning of the financial 
liberalization. The economies have started to be dependent on each other and 
capital flows become more volatile with the rise of the financial liberalization. 
Today’s financial crises confronted all developed and emerging countries 
including transition economies with decreasing capital inflows and export 
demand (Ghosh, 2006) as well as high capital building (Herrmann and Jochem, 
2005). Dynamics of financial crises cannot be examined in isolation of one 
economic factor from another (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998). According to 
this observation, both domestic factors and external factors (shocks) 
(Eichengreen and Adalet, 2005; Nuti, 2009) lead to financial crises. This paper 
aims to define a critical analysis on financial crises in order to provide an 
understanding that current account deficit is not the sole reason of crises.    
The study will be structured as follows: the first part intends to describe the 
current account and current account sustainability concepts. The second part 
illustrates the causes and consequences of the financial crises. The third part 
explains the dynamics of crisis indicators and the final part provides an analysis 
on selected countries’ economies in terms of their economic indicators in 
relation to financial crisis. A model representing the factors that have impacts 
on current account balance is constructed. As methodology, multiple regression 
analysis is utilized with SPSS statistics program. The country samples 
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compromise the Central and Eastern European accession countries (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia) to the EU plus Russia and 
Turkey. The purpose of this selection is related to the fact that these countries 
provide an excellent description and comparison both in terms of liberalization 
and globalization. 
As regards to the data gathering technique, data mining among published works 
is provided through the analysis, especially Eurostat, IMF, Worldbank statistics 
and country reports published by international institutions, universities and 
countries’ ministries.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
DEFICIT AND ITS SUSTAINABILITY 
    “No country was failed because of trading.” 
  Benjamin Franklin 
 
The balance of payments shows of all the economic transactions between the 
residents of a country and the rest of the world for a specific time period. This 
is composed of three elements: current account balance, capital balance and 
international (official) reserves changes.  The current account balance denotes 
international flows of goods and services and transfer payments. The capital 
balance records the borrowing and lending transactions between the residents of 
a country and outside residents of the country and stable capital investments. 
This balance helps to finance the current account balance. The balance of 
payments displays the net flow of money to the country before the changes in 
official reserves. The below balance of payments definition is always correct 
under the normal conditions: 
Current Account Balance + Capital Balance = International (official) reserves 
changes. 
It can be said that current account balance is a part of the general economic 
equilibrium. 
The basic national income equation is; 
Y = C + I + G + (X-M)   (1) 
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In this equation Y represents gross domestic product, C private sector's 
consumption expenditures, I public and private sectors' investment 
expenditures, G government purchases of goods and services, X imports of 
goods and services and M exports of goods and services. (X -M) is the current 
account balance accordingly. 
The disposable income which is not consumed can be accepted as saving. Thus, 
the disposable income equation becomes; 
Y – T = C + S   (2) 
Y represents national income, T taxes, C consumption and S total private 
sector's savings. 
It can be concluded from equation 1 and 2: 
(S – I) + (T – G) = (X – M)  (3) 
In this equation, (S – I) represents private sector's saving-investment balance, 
(T -G) government financing balance and (X – M) current account balance. If 
the private sector invests more than its savings and the public sector runs 
financing deficit, current account deficit is inevitable. This means that total 
savings deficit is financing through the import of foreign savings.  
Private sector’s saving balance depends on various economic developments; 
however, public sector’s saving balance is a political variable. Public sector can 
give a financing surplus while private sector is running a saving deficit. This 
prevents a current account deficit and thus, private sector’s saving deficits are 
financed hugely by public sector’s saving surplus. 
Obsttfeld and Rogoff (1995) stated that the current accounts widen and narrow 
according to the performance of national output, investments, government 
spending and world interest rate according to their permanent levels. If a 
country is a net foreign debtor and the world interest rate exceeds its permanent 
level, the current account deficit will increase. 
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The importance of the current account imbalances as a warning signal of 
currency crisis has been generally accepted. It has been also shown that a 
widening current account deficit is usually present before an exchange rate 
crisis.  
Current account balance is an important indicator of an economy. It reflects the 
saving-investment ratio which is related with the fiscal balance and private 
savings which are the main signs of the economic growth. It is important to 
monitor the current account balance data and to be informed on how it will be 
in the future for the economy. Policy makers should initiate new policies where 
and when needed to secure the current account sustainability. CAD/GDP ratio 
level has to be considered at this point. It has been discussing that different 
countries may have different acceptable sustainable CAD/GDP ratio levels. 
Current account deficits above 5% GDP should be considered as an alarming 
signal (Milesi- Ferreti and Razin, 1996). 
Roubini and Watchel (1998) argued that the current account deficits seen in 
transition economies reflect two important aspects. On one hand, these deficits 
reflect the success of structural changes that have enabled capital and 
investment inflows which has been the reason of the fast economic growth. On 
the other hand, current account deficits reflect mismanaged transition processes 
that become a source of a balance of payment crisis (e.g. Czech Rep. (1997), 
Russia (1998)).  
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) ask three questions on the current account 
sustainability: Is a debtor country solvent? Are current account imbalances 
sustainable? Is the current account deficit excessive? They define the current 
account balance equation as below: 
CAt = Ft - F t-1 = Yt + rF t-1 - Ct- It - Gt. (4)  
In this equation, CA represents current account balance, F net foreign debt, r 
world interest rate, Y gross domestic product, C private sector's consumption 
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expenditures, I public and private sectors' investment expenditures, G 
government purchases of goods and services. When private sector and 
government’s budget constraints are added to the above equation, the new 
equation will be: 
CA t = (Yt – Yt p) – (Ct – Ct p) – (It –It p) – (Gt – Gt p)    (5) 
For a country which fulfills its obligations, a current account balance is defined 
being the permanent value deviation of the output, consumption, investment 
and government’s expenditures (Milesi-Ferreti and Razin, 1996). They figured 
out that CA/GDP ratio is composed of the foreign trade deficit and the debt 
dynamics terms. This statement shows that the debt dynamics have positive 
relations with the world interest rate and negative relations with the real 
appreciation of local currency and domestic growth rate. 
Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1996) stated that, to define the sustainability in 
relation to solvency for fiscal imbalances is easier because they depend on the 
direct policy decisions on taxation and government expenditure. According to 
them, to define the sustainability in relation to solvency for current account 
imbalances is more difficult because the current account imbalances show the 
interaction among the savings and investment decisions of the government and 
domestic private agents, and additionally among the savings and the lending 
decisions of the foreign investors. Another key indicator to ensure sustainability 
is the exchange rate which depends on future evolution of policy variables.  
Another way to determine a current account imbalance is to determine if the 
pursuance of the present status quo will oblige a policy shift like sudden 
tightening of monetary and fiscal policy causing a large recession, or will lead a 
crisis like an exchange rate collapse, ending up with the inability to cover 
external debts. The current account imbalance is said to be unsustainable if the 
above circumstances are verified. The policy shift may be driven by an external 
or domestic shock which will result in the lack of confidence of the foreign 
investors and the reversal of international capital flows. 
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In 1998, Reisen widened Milesi-Ferreti and Razin’s work and studied the 
current account deficit in the long-run. He denoted that a country needs to 
collect reserves in order to meet the increasing imports due to the economic 
growth in the long-run and in order to cope with the changes in the balance of 
payments. 
Robischek (1981) argued that if the public sector accounts were under control 
and domestic savings were increasing, there was no reason to worry about large 
current account deficits. The Lawson Doctrine states that the current account 
deficits that result from a shift in private sector behavior should not be a public 
policy concern (Edwards, 2001). The crises in the developing countries in the 
1980s showed this doctrine’s defects. A large current account deficit was 
accepted as a sign of trouble coming. Fischer (1998) pointed out that the matter 
is not a large deficit but an “unsustainable” external deficit. 
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) argue that especially when the current account 
deficit is financed with short-term debt or foreign exchange reserves and when 
it reflects high-consumption spending, any excess above 5% of GDP has to be 
considered as an alarm.  
When a country experience large and persistent current account deficit for a 
long period, this is something that should be analyzed carefully. This means 
that this country’s economy will need more foreign investment to finance this 
deficit and thus, the local currency will be under the risk of depreciation.  The 
use of the national reserves will damage the economy and the investors start to 
have some doubts on the countries near future performance to meet its external 
debt obligations. These indicators may create a critical atmosphere in the 
economic environment and exchange rate and external debt crises may become 
inevitable. On the other hand, the country may have a permanent current 
account deficit and may cover its external debt smoothly and grow in the course 
of time. It can be said that the CAD/GDP ratio provides inadequate information 
on the current account status without considering the other macroeconomic 
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indicators such as sources of deficit, external debt, fiscal deficit and exchange 
rate policy.  
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) determined some variables that anticipate the 
current account deficits’ narrowings as follows: 
• current account balance level, how much larger the CAD is, so is 
the possibility of narrowing, 
• foreign exchange reserves, how much lower the foreign 
exchange reserves are, so is the possibility of narrowing, 
• GDP per capita, how much larger the GDP per capita is, so is the 
possibility of narrowing, 
• foreign trade limits, when the foreign trade limits fall off, the 
possibility of narrowing increases, 
• investments, how much higher the investments are, so is the 
possibility of narrowing. 
They additionally highlight the importance of the solvency of a country to 
sustain a current account deficit. The country has to generate sufficient trade 
surpluses to cover existing debt but, the solvency depends also on the 
willingness of the creditors to lend under the present conditions which is related 
with the country’s willingness to cover its debt obligation at the time of an 
external shock. To evaluate current account sustainability, they classify the 
necessary variables into four categories: savings – investment propensity, 
economic growth rate, foreign trade openness and volume, composition of the 
external debt, fiscal status and capital flows that finance the deficit. High 
investment rates lead high growth rates in the future. This increases the 
solvency of the country. On the other hand, foreign trade related goods 
production becomes important in order to minimize foreign debt because more 
production means more FX gain. However, how much open the foreign trade is, 
so is higher the risk of turndown in the foreign demand or the risk of 
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deterioration in the foreign trade limits. The maturity structure and the form of 
the foreign debt, FX and interest rate composition are also considered as the 
important indicators. A liberal capital account makes the country more sensitive 
to the foreign shocks but at the same time, a liberal capital account has a 
disciplinary role on the domestic policies depending on the development level 
of the country (Tiryaki, 2002). 
Roubini and Watchel (1998) studied the current account sustainability in their 
works and suggested different variables such as current account composition, 
size and composition of the capital flows, country risk and FX reserves. 
Obstfeld (1994) and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1997) have shown the 
importance of trade and investment factors that make a country susceptible to 
contagion crises, as was seen during the East Asian crises. If a country’s 
exports decrease because of its trading partners’ crisis situation, this have 
effects on the country’s trade balance and can lead to an unsustainable current 
account position. Similarly, a country can face a crisis through contagion 
capital outflows from neighboring countries. This is very important for emrging 
market economies. 
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3. FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
Mishkin (1996) defined the financial crisis as following: 
“A financial crisis is a nonlinear disruption to financial markets in 
which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much 
worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds 
to those who have the most productive investment opportunities. A 
financial crisis thus results in the inability of financial markets to 
function efficiently, which leads to a sharp contraction in economic 
activity”. 
 
3.1. Economic factors that lead to a financial crisis 
It is important to understand asymmetric information concept to analyze the 
reasons that lead to the financial crisis. Asymmetric information is a situation in 
which one party to a financial contract has much less accurate information than 
the other party (Mishkin, 1996). For example, a borrower has much more 
detailed information than the lender on the return and on the risk of the 
investment project. Asymmetric information cause two important problems in 
the financial system: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection 
arises in the credit market. The potential borrowers who have much more risky 
projects will be the most gainful party. They are the most ambitious investors to 
borrow money but at the same time the most risky in terms of repayment. Moral 
hazard problem appears also in the credit market and is defined as undesirable 
activities of the borrower that decrease the possibility of loan repayment in the 
eyes of the lender. 
Three common indicators of the financial crises are first of all, to be deeply 
dependent on the short term capital inflows, secondly, chronic appreciation of 
real exchange rate and high current account deficits and lastly misuse of the 
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funds which are borrowed in an inadequately regulated environment (Öniş and 
Aysan, 2003). 
The following factors can trigger the banking and the financial crises: increase 
in interest rates, increase in uncertainty, fall in stock exchange, asset market 
effects on balance sheets and government fiscal imbalances: 
• Increases in interest rates: Asymmetric information and the resulting 
adverse selection problem can lead to credit rationing in which some 
borrowers do not accept to contract a loan even they are willing to pay 
higher interest rates. This happens because borrowers with higher risk 
projects are the ones who are ready to pay higher interest rates. Higher 
interest rates will cause a greater adverse selection and the lenders will 
not be ambitious to give credits. Decrease in the credit portfolio will end 
up with the fall in investment and have impacts on overall economy.  
• Increases in uncertainty: As a result of an increase in uncertainty in 
financial markets due to a recession, failure of a financial institution or 
political instability, the lenders will have difficulties to distinguish 
between high risk project and low ones. The adverse selection problem 
will grow and the lenders start to give less credit. 
• Asset market effects on balance sheets: Balance sheets of the non-
financial companies and banks have effects on the emphasis of 
asymmetric information problem on the financial system. Deterioration 
of the balance sheets will trigger a chain reaction and worsen the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. At the beginning, this will 
result in the fall in credit willingness of the lenders and then the bank 
failures may come up. If there are more than one bank failure in the 
system, bank panics will come into being. The source of the contagion 
is asymmetric information. Asymmetric information problem can be 
solved in the financial markets with the use of collateral (Mishkin, 
1996). Collateral reduces the potential losses of the lender in case of a 
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default. The lender can sell this collateral and recover its losses if the 
borrower defaults.  If the collateral is in good quality, asymmetric 
information between the lender and the borrower lose its importance. 
• Fall in Stock Exchange: A fall in stock exchange will have negative 
impacts on companies’ balance sheets and this will give rise to adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems which will pave way to a financial 
crisis. A decline in the stock market means a decline in the market 
values of the companies’ net worth. As a result of this, the banks will be 
less ambitious to give loans to the borrowers and will feel less 
comfortable because of the loss in the value of the collateral. Due to the 
adverse selection problem consequences, the banks will reduce their 
credit exposure. The fall in stock exchange will also force the borrowers 
to be directed into the high risk investments which will raise the moral 
hazard problem because the firms will have less to lose ( due to the 
decline in their net worth) if their investment defaults. This will result in 
the decrease in the investments and in the overall economic activity. 
• Government Fiscal Imbalances: In emerging markets, government 
fiscal imbalances may create impressions of default on government 
debt. Thus, government may have difficulties to sell its bonds and may 
put pressure on banks to purchase them. If the government defaults, the 
banks’ financials will weaken. Additionally, the default fear on the 
government debt can cause a foreign exchange crisis. The domestic 
currency starts to suffer depreciation due to the investors who carry off 
the funds outside the country. The fall in the domestic currency will 
affect negatively the balance sheets of the companies which have large 
amounts of foreign currency debts. This situation will lead to an 
increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems which cause a 
decrease in lending (Mishkin, 2007). 
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A currency crisis and then a banking crisis become inevitable when adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems are accompanied with these factors 
(Mishkin, 2007). Asymmetric information analysis, which has been using to 
understand the structure of the financial system, has been also the source of a 
theory on banking and financial crises. This theory has been utilized to expand 
the crisis in the developed countries like the United States but also, with some 
amendments, has been applied to the emerging markets (Mishkin, 1996). 
Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events in the Emerging Markets Financial Crises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mishkin (2007) 
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3.2. Currency Crises 
This model was firstly introduced by Krugman in 1979. Zavala (1999) claims 
that the below items should be considered as the main indicators of the currency 
crises: 
• Fiscal situation 
• Level of International Reserves 
• Current Account Sustainability 
• Real Exchange Rate 
Currency crises can be analyzed in three categories: first generation crises, 
second generation crises and third generation crises. 
 
3.2.1. First generation crises 
Governments follow fiscal and monetary policies which are not compatible 
with a fixed exchange rate regime. This creates some problems in balance of 
payments. Speculators, at one point, recognize that Central Bank can not 
maintain anymore foreign exchange parity and then a speculative attack comes 
into the currency. In the first generation models, fixed exchange regime is 
determined by the external basic indicators which are not related with the 
individual behaviors in the economy. According to these models, individuals’ 
expectations do not have any influences on fiscal imbalances and on credit 
policies (Pesenti-Tille,2000). First generation currency crises occur due to the 
inconsistency between the economic policies imbalances and the effort to fix 
the foreign exchange rate. If the Central Bank has enough FX reserves, this 
does not create any problems but if not, the Central Bank will stay in a difficult 
situation (Krugman, 2000).  
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Calvo (1995) argued that one of the most remarkable features in the Krugman 
model is the sudden loss in reserves at a specific point in time, even though 
market participants have perfect foresight and, thus, nobody is taken by 
surprise. The central bank does not take any action to sterilize the capital 
outflows; therefore, facing the reduction of the monetary base and lacking the 
reserves to maintain the nominal value of the exchange rate, the, fixed exchange 
regime collapses and the central bank is obliged to float its currency. 
In 1994 Mexican crisis, the Central Bank lost its reserves against a speculative 
attack to Mexican peso. The Central Bank intervened to the market to defend 
monetary base and injected liquidity. This intervention of the Central Bank to 
the market is called sterilization (Zavala, 1999). Flood, Graber and Kramer 
(1996) showed that in the real world, reserves losses at the time of the 
speculative attach are sterilized contrarily to Krugman speculative attack 
scenario. They state that speculative attack scenario can be widened to cover 
bond markets that are affected by the sterilization policies which are 
implemented by the monetary authorities. The Central Bank will use its 
authority to issue money and expand domestic loan by the same amount of their 
loss in reserves. This will be supported by the monetary authorities’ open 
market operations (to buy government bonds held by the private sector). If the 
monetary authorities do not sterilize the currency attack, the monetary base will 
shrink and interest rates will increase (Zavala, 1999). Interest rate increase may 
sometimes be very high which may be resulted in banking crisis. If the 
government domestic debt is linked to short term interest rates, the debt service 
will become more costly. In this situation, the Central Bank will restart 
sterilization or will let the currency to float. 
Krugman (1998) argues that, in the first generation crisis models, the domestic 
credit expansion is unsustainable due to the limited stock of international 
reserves to maintain the peg. Investors expect an explosion and create a 
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speculative attack on the domestic currency when reserves fall into a critical 
level.  
 
3.2.2. Second Generation Crises 
Obstfeld (1996) states that even sustainable currency pegs may be attacked an 
even broken. In this model, the government wants to devalue the currency 
(because of the expansionist monetary policies due to the high domestic debt or 
high unemployment rate) and to try to sustain exchange rate peg (to revive 
international trade or to control inflation or just because of the national 
feelings) at the same time (Chowdhry-Goyal, 2000).  
According to Obstfeld (1996), to try to sustain exchange rate peg is costly, if 
the majority of the public expects devaluation. This is when the speculator 
attack arises. The devaluation expectations cause higher interest rates to sustain 
exchange rate peg but at the end, the government abandons the exchange rates 
due to the slowdown in the economic growth and due to the cost increase in the 
state debts. It can be concluded that the currency crises may be developed by 
the self-fulfilling expectations (Zavala, 1999). 
The below factors are used to define the reasons of the second generation 
crises: 
• Real exchange rate appreciation 
• M2-to-Reserves expansion 
• Terms of trade deterioration 
• Domestic credit expansion 
• Wage flexibility 
• Output growth 
• Contagion effects 
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• Herd behavior (Zavala, 1999). 
 
3.2.2.1. Contagion 
Macroeconomic imbalances are generally the main reason of the currency 
crises. Unsustainable current account deficits may change the direction of the 
capital inflows and cause big changes in the FX rates. Inelastic FX regimes 
pave the way to the high appreciation of the currency which results in the high 
foreign deficits. Instability in the FX market is transmitted from one country to 
another (IMF, 1998). 
Table 3.1: Mean Correlations of Monthly Equity Market Returns, 1970s-
1990s 
 
  Among countries in the 
region 
Among countries in other 
regions 
Region 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Asia  0.11 0.11 0.41 0.08 0.25 0.41 
Europe  0.14 0.33 0.38 0.07 0.24 0.37 
G-7 0.15 0.3 0.29 0.11 0.17 0.22 
Latin America  0.07 -0.01 0.26 -0.14 0.25 0.32 
Source: Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries. World 
Bank 1998 from Zavala, 1999. 
The mean correlations of monthly equity market returns in the Latin America 
and Asia have been increasing since 1970s for the countries in the region and 
outside the region. In the 1980s, Latin America has had an inverse correlation 
between the countries in the region. In the 1990s the coefficient has increased to 
0.26. The coefficient has had a rising trend for the countries outside the region 
as well. In Asia, the coefficient is very high for the countries in the region and 
for the countries outside the region. The capital market integration in this table 
shows the contagion effects that financial crises can have across markets due to 
the shifts in expectations (Zavala, 1999). 
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3.2.2.2. Herd Behavior 
Krugman (1998) argues that exchange markets are not efficient (characteristic 
of the first and second generation models). Its basic indicator is herding which 
is the tendency for individuals to mimic the actions of a larger group. As a 
result of the financial integration, speculative attacks to the currencies in the 
financial markets spread from one country to another. Exchange markets can 
create a self-fulfilling expectation that a central bank would not sustain the 
exchange rate peg at the time of a successful speculative attack, leading to 
contagion and herd behavior (Zavala, 1999). 
 
3.2.3. Third Generation Crises 
In the third generation crisis model, the banking sector becomes another source 
of instability in the country in addition to the deprecation of the country’s basic 
economic indicators, to the shift on the market expectations and to the 
government’s failure to maintain the foreign exchange peg (characteristics of 
the first and second generation crises). Third generation crisis model does not 
deal only with the currency crises. Banking and currency crises are monitored 
at the same time in this model.  
In the first and second generation crises’ models, there are not any policy 
recommendations to the Central Bank at the time of a crisis. According to 
Krugman’s first generation crisis model, the crisis is inevitable when there is a 
devaluation expectation. In the third generation crises model initiated by 
Krugman (1999) and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banarjee (2000, 2001), monetary 
policy’s effects on currency crisis is analyzed (Chiodo-Owyang, 2002). These 
models argue that banking and finance sectors’ fragility causes a decline in the 
credits which are allocated for the companies and this strengthens a crisis 
possibility. Third generation crises models also show that a currency crisis will 
arise by a combination of high debt, low foreign reserves, decreasing 
  
 
19
government revenue, increasing expectations of devaluation and domestic 
borrowing constraints (Chiodo-Owyang, 2002).  
To cure a currency crisis, the best thing to do is to increase the interest rates and 
increase the demand for domestic currency. However, in the third generation 
models, an interest rate increase can influence the amount of lending and 
impede the companies to fully access to financial capital. A rise in the nominal 
interest rate may be destructive when the lending is highly sensitive to interest 
rates by changing economic productivity as a result of the depressing 
investment. A fall in the output, with the decreased tax income, puts an 
additional pressure on FX rate and deepens the crisis. In this situation, Central 
Bank will decrease the interest rates to vitalize the investments (Chiodo-
Owyang, 2002).  
All generation of models suggest four factors that can impact the starting and 
magnitude of a currency crisis: domestic and private public debt, expectations, 
status of the financial markets, determination of the magnitude of the 
speculative attack and probability of its success and possibility of a currency 
crisis with a pegged exchange regime (Chiodo-Owyang, 2002). 
 
3.3. Banking Crises 
A currency crisis may result in a banking crisis. Banking regulations force the 
banks to equalize the value of its FX denominated assets to FX denominated 
liabilities. In this respect, it is not sure that the depreciation of the currency will 
affect the banks’ balance sheets negatively or not. The risk still exists in spite of 
the equalization of FX denominated assets to FX denominated liabilities. In an 
emerging market like Mexico, banks’ FX assets are the FX loans that are 
lended to the companies in the country. Once devaluation realizes, the balance 
sheets of the companies, which have FX loans in their credit portfolio, will start 
to deteriorate because their liabilities become more valuable. As their assets are 
in national currency, they will not improve in value. These companies will not 
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be able to pay its debts to the banks and this will influence banks’ financials 
negatively. The FX risk for the borrowers will become credit risk for the banks 
(Mishkin, 1999). 
Banking crisis is longer and more costly than the currency crises: average 
amount of time until GDP growth returned to trend is 3 years and output growth 
loss is 11.5%. If a banking crisis happens after a currency crisis in one year, the 
output growth loss increase to 14.5%. Recovery period after currency and 
banking crises in emerging countries is shorter than in the industrialized 
countries. The reason is that the emerging markets have higher output growth 
average and variance (IMF, 1998). 
A pegged exchange rate regime can be dangerous for an emerging economy if 
its banking system is not powerful enough (with short term debt contracts and 
big amounts of FX denominated debt). Depreciation of the domestic currency 
will result in devaluation and increase in the interest rates and in indebtedness 
which will deteriorate the banks’ and the companies’ balance sheets. Thus, the 
developing economy will tumble into a full scale financial crisis. Some 
developing economies chose to peg their domestic currency to a stable currency 
because they need a nominal anchor to secure the price stability. This may be a 
very dangerous strategy if the banking system of the developing country is 
fragile (Mishkin, 1996).  
 
3.4. Early Warning Signals 
A depreciation of the exchange rate may provide an early warning signal to 
policymakers to adjust their policies to limit the possibility of a crisis (Mishkin, 
1996). 
The below study was prepared by IMF in 1998, using a data of fifty countries 
for the period 1975-97. This was found out that some indicators correctly 
signaled crises a number of times and did not sound frequent false alarms. 
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These were the real exchange rate, credit growth and M2-to-reserve ratio. 
Additionally, the study showed that the over valuation of the exchange rate was 
one of the earliest signals of vulnerability. Real exchange rate appreciation 
signals a currency crisis 13 months before the beginning of the crisis. The other 
leading indicator was the broad money indicator (M2) to international reserves. 
The reason is that the countries implementing domestic policies which are not 
consistent with the exchange rate system and this result in the increasing loss in 
international reserves. Because of the sterilization policies of the central bank to 
prevent the narrowing of the money base, the value of the indicator raises, 
which shows that the level of international reserves are inadequate to cover the 
liquidity of the economy in case of a speculative attack (Zavala, 1999). 
In 1995, Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdés studies four currency crises that 
have common characteristics: Chile 1978-82, Mexico 1978-82, Finland 1988-
92, Mexico 1990-94. Exchange rate overvaluation had a direct impact on the 
external deficit and on high interest rates. In both Mexican crises fiscal 
expansion contrasts with the first generation models variables. In Chile, Mexico 
and Finland, foreign exchange appreciation with high interest rates had negative 
effects on the banking system. 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) have showed 103 indicators which are 
analyzed in six categories: external sector, financial sector, real sector, public 
finances, institutional and structural variables, political variables. They suggest 
an early warning system which monitors several indicators showing unusual 
behavior before the times of the crisis. An indicator lapsing a certain value 
has to be interpreted as a warning signal that a currency crisis may occur 
within the following twenty four hours. The variables with best track record in 
the study are exports, deviation of the real exchange rate, the ratio of broad 
money to gross international reserves, output, equity prices. Imports, bank 
deposits, the difference between foreign and real domestic real deposit interest 
rates, ratio of lending to deposit interest rates are the indicators which are not 
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supported the study’s evidence. The authors have determined a signal that is 
followed by a crisis within twenty four months a 'good signal', a signal which is 
not followed by a crisis is called a ''bad signal'' or a ''noise''. 
 
Table 3.2: Significance of Early Warning Indicators of Vulnerability to 
Currency Crises 
 
Months Prior to a 
Crisis 
Indicator  
Country 
Group  
13 
months 
8 months 
3 
months
Real exchange rate 
appreciation  Industrial  • • • 
  Emerging 
market  • • • 
Domestic credit 
expansion  Industrial   • • 
  Emerging 
market   • • 
M2-to-reserves 
expansion  Industrial  • • • 
  Emerging 
market  • • • 
Stock price decline  
Industrial  • • • 
 Emerging 
market    
Low domestic real 
interest rates  Industrial • •  
  Emerging 
market     
Terms of trade 
deterioration  Industrial     
  Emerging 
market   •  
World real interest rate 
increase  Industrial    • 
  Emerging 
market    • 
 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook, May 1998. 
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Table 3.3: Common Factors of Currency Collapses 
 
  Chile Mexico Mexico Finland 
Factor  1982 1982 1994 1992 
Appreciation  
 yes yes yes yes 
Disinflation  
 yes yes yes yes 
External Deficit  yes yes yes yes 
Fiscal Expansion  no yes yes no 
High Real Interest Rates  yes yes yes yes 
Trade Liberalization  yes yes yes yes 
Financial Opening  yes yes yes yes 
Domestic Credit Creation  yes yes yes yes 
Opening to External Capital yes yes yes yes 
 
Source: Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdés (1995). 
 
3.5. Financial Liberalization and Capital Flows  
After the World War II, international monetary system was regularized by 
Bretton Woods. According to the agreement, central banks, to maintain the 
exchange rate, could sell and buy national currencies. This was called pegged 
rate currency regime. Member states were required to establish a parity of their 
national currencies in terms of gold (a "peg") and to maintain exchange rates 
within plus or minus 1% of parity (a "band") by intervening in their foreign 
exchange markets. The U.S. dollar was the currency with the most purchasing 
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power and it was the only currency that was backed by gold. Additionally, all 
European nations that had been involved in World War II were highly in debt 
 
Table 3.4: Average Lead Time 
 
Indicator Number of months in Advance of the Crisis When 
First Signal Occurs 
Real Exchange Rate  17 
Real interest rate  17 
Imports  16 
M2 multiplier  16 
Output  16 
Bank deposits  15 
Excess M1 Balances  15 
Exports  15 
Terms of Trade  15 
International reserves  15 
Stock prices  14 
Real interest differential  14 
M2/international reserves 13 
Lending rate/deposit rate  13 
Domestic credit/GDP  12 
 
Source: Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., Reinhart,C.(1997) 
and transferred large amounts of gold into the United States, a fact that 
contributed to the supremacy of the United States. Thus, the U.S. dollar was 
strongly appreciated in the rest of the world and therefore became the key 
currency of the Bretton Woods system. There are two important institutions in 
Bretton Woods system: International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
The main assignments of IMF are to control the fluctuation in the rates of 
exchange, to decrease the balance of payments deficits, to facilitate the member 
states’ growth and help to increase the international trade volume. World Bank 
is standing by the developing countries with long term credits. These credits are 
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secured by the bonds which are sold by World Bank in the capital markets 
(Mishkin, 2007). Foreign exchange rates shift only when the member states run 
balance of payments surpluses or deficits. Once a member state was running a 
balance of payments deficit and lost their international reserves, to maintain the 
pegged rate, IMF was helping the problematic country by lending funds that the 
other member states derived. Tight monetary policy was suggested to the debtor 
country by IMF to close the deficit. If IMF loans could not help the debtor 
country to stop the national currency depreciation, devaluation was allowed 
(Mishkin, 2007). 
After the collapse of Bretton Woods system at the beginning of the 1970s, the 
liberalization moves and technological developments have strengthened the 
international financial markets. Financial liberalization concept is composed 
of the removal of the control on interest rates, the privatization of the financial 
institutions, the encouragement of the competition between the institutions and 
the entrance authorization into the financial markets, the decrease in the reserve 
requirements and the reliance on open market operations as a money market 
policy (Zavala, 1999). 
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the liberalization of the 
capital account has become a part of the enforced policies in the industrialized 
and emerging economies. In the 1990s, the composition and the buyers of the 
capital flows have been changed. Today, capital flows are from private to 
private; the main buyer is the private sector. In the past, the capital flows were 
from private to state or they were the loans for the government projects. As to 
the composition of the capital flows in the 1980s, they were in the form of 
syndicated loans or direct debts to the state. In the 1990s, these are replaced by 
direct foreign investment, bank to bank loans, portfolio investment on bonds 
and on equity securities and trade finance. Total net capital inflows into 
emerging markets were USD 30 billion in 1990 and USD 173.7 billion in 1997. 
In 1990, net private capital flows composed 58.3% of the total flows and state’s 
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loans composed the rest 41.7% of the total flows. In 1995, the net private 
capital flows were increased to 84.7%. In 1996 before the Asian Crisis, private 
sector’s shares reached 100% of the total flows. International fund resource of 
USD 1.04 trillion was utilized by the emerging markets between the years 
1990-1996 (42.6% foreign direct investment, 36.5% portfolio investment, direct 
bank flows 20.9%). Direct foreign investment is more stable and can be 
recovered easily at the time of a crisis due to the long maturity. On the contrary, 
short term capital flows, portfolio investment and direct bank loans are more 
volatile (Zavala, 1999). 
Deregulation and liberalization may be dangerous in the emerging market 
economies if they are not managed carefully. Banks’ regulatory and supervisory 
structure should be in place when the liberalization comes into the country. If 
not, banks may take unlimited risks which may be resulted in deterioration in 
their balance sheets in the near future. The loan expertise is also very important 
for the banks at the time of liberalization (Mishkin,1996). 
After the 2008, financial crises became a more significant topic than ever due to 
its global nature. In fact, since 1990s, several ad hoc crises on country basis 
have been observed, yet needed to be recovered each time. US GDP is expected 
to fall by about 3 % and by a decrease of 5.75 percent in Japan in 2009. 
Moreover, the economic recession has increasingly spilled over to the emerging 
and developing economies. Following the impact of the significant policy 
motivation worldwide, gradually recovery and downturn in trade flows, global 
growth is expected to improve to close to 2 % in 2010 (Economic Forecast, 
2009). 
Studies on developed and developing countries focus of the link between 
devaluation, current account and output indicators (Edwards, 2001; 2007) as 
well as the relationship between balance-of-payments and banking crisis 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997; Öniş, 2007). However, today’s 2008 
global financial crisis refer to further studies that provided results that are 
related to not only foreign exchange reserves, real exchange rate but also US 
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interest rates, economic situation in the industrialized countries and openness 
(Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998). Nevertheless, considering common 
mechanisms of financial crises, especially in developing countries, since 1990s, 
a number of financial crises occurred in emerging markets share familiar 
characteristics. These crises are mostly the consequences of a rapid economic 
growth. Roubini (2007) discloses various alternative explanations of global 
imbalances. These are US fiscal deficits, US Central Bank’s savings, global 
investment deficiency, structural factors, long run productivity and 
demographic trends, housing booms, financial globalization and asset shortage, 
easy monetary policy in the US, oil price shocks, and uncertainty.   
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4. DYNAMICS OF FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING    
MARKETS 
 
The dynamics of financial crises in emerging markets can be analyzed within 
three motives of national economies: 1. Economic growth, 2. Liberal economic 
policies, and 3. Economic openness. 
 
4.1. Economic Growth 
Economic growth is one of the main signs of the impacts, extension and results 
of a possible financial crisis. It might be related with possible rises in gross 
domestic product as well as the quantity of goods and services produced 
(Henderson, 2007). Economic growth dynamics are analyzed through indicators 
of real GDP growth rate and current account in percentage of GDP. 
 
4.1.1. GDP Growth Rate 
GDP is one of the significant indicators in terms of an analysis on financial 
crises. As such, it is one representation of the global expansion in relation to 
country’s expectations that depend on the maintenance of the expansion. For 
instance, growth might be strong in one country but not in the other; hence, a 
common concern has come into being on global markets. On the one hand, 
considering the large EU countries, namely France and Germany’s rigid 
economic policies and stable GDP might provide a secure place for investors. 
On the other hand, for example, Russia’s falling indicators might create an 
insecure environment in global markets that might lead to unexpected attacks of 
investors. Considering the crisis indicators, especially in relation to economic 
growth, GDP growth rate is another dynamic to be analyzed in order to clarify 
credit position of governments, budget deficit, associated with expansionary 
credit or monetary policy of governments which might become inconsistent 
with fixed exchange rate (Krugman, 1979). 
 
 
  
 
29
4.1.2. Current Account in percentage of GDP 
Following the fall in imports in parallel with exports during the recession, the 
current account deficit widens in the emerging countries. The main 
characteristic of these countries is to possess heavy large current account 
deficits, together with decreasing GDP indicators. The reliance of these 
countries on foreign savings makes them vulnerable against external shocks. 
The factor of current account deficit must be analyzed in relation to further 
investment opportunities, possible FDI, external debt obligations, FX reserves, 
export volume GDP growth rate, their agenda of the EU accession and 
integration, rapid credit and consumption growth as well as exchange rate 
policies.  
 
4.2.  Liberal Economic Policies 
Liberal economic policies are the main motives of developing countries to 
achieve and maintain economic growth. However, uncontrollable and 
unsustainable liberal policies might lead to destruction of the pillar of economic 
production. In other words, national governments of emerging economies adopt 
a secured exchange rate regime in order to overcome with inflation as well as to 
attract more foreign capital. However, this kind of control results in an 
exchange rate-based stabilization of prices to be able to eliminate exchange risk 
that is perceived by foreign investors. Therefore, capital inflows are appreciated 
together with not only financial opening but also attractive interest rates. 
 
4.2.1. Inflation 
Considering the emerging countries with their weak position in macroeconomic 
fundamentals, fiscal policies together with central bank monetization of 
government debts might lead to high inflation as well as high current account 
deficits. In these countries, inflation has continued to increase rapidly that also 
damaged the credibility of exchange rate and thus triggered speculative attacks, 
that resulted in exchange rate crisis. Therefore, chronic inflation (Calvo and 
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Végh, 1992) that showed the way of pressure on the exchange rate that eroded 
countries’ competitiveness in external trade (Kregel, 1998).  
Contrary to Asian crisis where the currencies of Singapore and Taiwan were 
devalued in 1997 without any drastic financial destruction(Fischer, 1998), the 
pegged currency suffered a harsh speculative attack in 1997 which resulted in 
the devaluation in the Czech Republic(Corsetti, et.al., 1998). 
 
4.2.2. Interest Rates 
The term structure of interest rates is determined by the riskiness of different 
debt maturities, and these reflect the possibility of a crisis associated with 
illiquid portfolios. Consequently, the role of short term debt in generating a 
crisis can only be analyzed in terms of debt maturity and the term structure of 
interest rates. (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). 
For instance, borrowing money from a country where the interest rate is lower, 
a country with pegged interest rates might profit from the lower interest rate. In 
the case of pegged exchange rates, investors may not be concerned about 
earning domestic currency to refund the loans in dollars. However, if the US 
dollar is weak, the country’s currency and private sector might lose a 
considerable amount of money in relation to interest rate. Therefore, during the 
crisis, countries’ currency conditions coupled with their interest rate policies 
affect the country’ position against foreign currencies. 
 
4.3. Economic Openness 
Financial crises are mostly preceded by a considerable growth of capital 
inflows in a context of a nominal exchange rate which was softly pegged 
(Mexico, East Asia and Turkey) or hardly pegged (Argentina). Therefore, 
economic openness needs to be analyzed in relation to capital movements, 
exchange rate regime and trade balance. 
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4.3.1. Openness to International Finance 
Depending on the characteristics of economic policies, rigid or flexible, 
proactive or reactive, transition economies might experience more prolonged 
decline due to their direct exposure to the financial crisis. Similarly, these 
countries might confront misalignments in their external financing conditions 
that make the national economy more vulnerable to external volatility. 
 
4.3.2. Capital Movements 
One of the most fragile factors in financial crises is capital inflows and outflows 
that most probable lead to speculative attacks in national economies. More 
specifically, private capital flows to emerging market and developing countries 
might be decreasing during 2008. In fact, with the overall net current account 
surplus of these countries rising further might help keep the accumulation of 
international reserves high. 
Wachtel (1998) explains three main drives of financial crises in transition 
countries during 1990s. Therefore, these are first the collapse of output and 
production that lead to the decrease in national savings as well as unsustainable 
in relation to private and public consumption. Second, the other is capital 
outflow with an extensive capital flight that results in capital account surplus 
that turns into domestic investment. The third is capital inflows come from 
foreign borrowing, portfolio investments, deposit inflows and foreign direct 
investments and finance both investment and consumption. 
 
4.3.3. Exchange Rate Regime 
According to the research on the crisis indicators, a rapid growth of money 
supply might lead to the currency overvaluation, which is associated with 
decreasing reserves coupled with high exchange rate. Accordingly, the banking 
system under the routes of international reserves manipulates investors’ 
expectations about the exchange rate credibility. Therefore, these expectations 
dependent on exchange rate movements affect the country’s vulnerability 
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against an external financial shock (Dabrowski, 2003; Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco, 1996). 
 
4.3.4. External Trade 
As a reference to Krugman (1979), trade balance deficit as a percentage to GDP 
is related to appreciation of the exchange rate (which might result in financial 
crisis). In light of this observation, financial crises are also related to terms-of-
trade shifts for example in oil price increases; to currency over-valuation under 
pegged exchange rate regimes; to stock market crash; and to simultaneous 
political and economic shocks (Patel and Sarkar, 1999).  
National economies that are highly export-oriented have been considerably 
affected by the collapse in global production and thus the movement of goods 
and services. The following tables apparently provide an overview of this 
collapse, especially after 2008. 
 
4.4. Current Account Deficits and Current Account Sustainability 
Countries with healthy government reserves and stable export performance lead 
to strong current account position for the country. However, external financial 
and economic conditions, for example, which emerge along with a global 
recession might directly or indirectly effect country’s stance against the outside 
markets. Therefore, current account situation may not explain the whole 
processes of recession in a given country. 
The rise in current account deficits in these economies has raised concerns 
about their sustainability in relation to the impacts of deficit on economic 
downturn and its recovery (Aristovnik, 2007).  
According to Roubini and Wachtel (1998), the current account deficits in 
transition economies are related to both negative and positive factors. On one 
hand, the current account deficits may represent positive structural changes in 
order to increase capital and investment inflows for rapid economic growth. On 
the other hand, these deficits may lead to unsustainable imbalances resulted in a 
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currency crisis or a balance of payments crisis, like in Czech Republic in 1997 
or in Russia in 1998 (Roubini and Wachtel (1998) in Aristovnik, 2007). 
Therefore, an unsustainable deficit should be distinguished from an excessive 
one (Edwards, 2001; 2007; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1996).  
Aristovnik (2007) argued that, an “arbitrary threshold of 4 percent of GDP” for 
future FDI resulted in a more sustainable current account deficit. However, 
some countries may reveal unsustainable levels of current account deficits in 
the medium term. Accordingly, on the assumption of the medium level of FDI 
flows, a higher level of external deficit revealed, like in Hungary and Romania. 
As a result, the current account deficits of transition economies in excess of 5 
percent of GDP generally pose external sustainability problems. Therefore, a 
strong external position for FDI coupled with a cautious fiscal policy might 
lead to current account sustainability. 
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) studied the experience of persistent current 
account imbalances in seven countries: Australia, Chile, Ireland, Israel, 
Malaysia, Mexico and South Korea. They outlined three types of persistent 
current account balances. A country can have a persistent current account 
deficit for several years with no crisis such as the case for Australia in 1981-
1994 and in Malaysia in 1991-1995. In the second case, a country’s persistent 
current account deficits will cause a policy reversal. This policy reversal 
increases ameliorate the current account position such as in the case of Ireland 
in 1979-1990, Israel 1982-1986, Malaysia in 1979-1986 and South Korea in 
1978-1988. In the third case, a persistent current account deficit leads a crisis. 
The country can not fulfill its debt obligations such as in the case of Chile 
1977-1982, Mexico in 1977-1982 and 1991-1995. Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 
(1996) categorized the factors that affect the crises into four: structural features, 
macroeconomic policy position, political factors and market expectations. 
Structural features included economic growth, investment, trade, foreign 
investment and external liabilities. Macroeconomic policy position covered 
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exchange rate policy and fiscal policy. Political factors denoted credibility and 
stability and market expectations bond prices and interest rate spreads.  
The sustainability of the current account position of the selected countries with 
a referral to pre-crisis and post crisis years’ indicators are analyzed. 
Additionally, based on empirical literature, a model has been constructed for 
describing factors that have impact on current account balance. This study’s 
structural features include real GDP growth rate, real net foreign direct 
investment inflows/GDP, real exports/GDP, real external debt/GDP and foreign 
exchange reserves/external debt. As a macroeconomic policy indicator, 
inflation rate is added into the study. Data from 1992 to 2005 is used.  
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5. COUNTRY ANALYSIS ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS AND 
FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
The sample includes seven countries which have experienced financial crises in 
the 1990s: 
¾ Bulgaria, February 1997. To break the hyperinflation, the introduction 
of a currency board with stabilizing effects on the value of the currency. 
¾ Czech Republic, May 1997. Large macroeconomic balances, due to a 
real appreciation and a lack of structural reforms caused an increase in 
the current account deficit and put speculative attacks on Koruna. 
¾ Hungary, second half of 1993 and 1997. Eight banks, 25% of the 
financial system assets, were insolvent in 1993. The fall in output 
caused a sharp decline in national savings and significant budget deficit 
were the main characteristics of 1997 crisis. 
¾ Romania, February 1997. Decline in the output and investment and 
structural weaknesses in the banking sector triggered off a depreciation 
by nearly 20% against USD within two weeks. 
¾ Russia, August 1998. After the pressure on Ruble, Central Bank raised 
the interest rates from 30% to 150% to defend the currency. Increased 
speculative attack caused the devaluation. 
¾ Slovenia,1992-1994. Two-thirds of banking system assets were 
restructured. Recapitalization cost totaled USD 1.3 billion. 
¾ Turkey, April 1994 and November 2000 – February 2001. High current 
account deficits associated with public sector expenditures booming, 
inflation rose to three-digit levels, Central Bank lost half of its reserves 
in 1994 crisis. 19 banks have been taken over by Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund during 2001 crisis. (Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K., 
2009). 
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5.1. Bulgaria 
During the 1990s, Bulgaria witnessed three financial crises that caused the 
currency depreciation, banking crises, economic downturn together with the 
collapse of the exchange rate and hyperinflation (Ganev, 2003 and Dabrowski, 
2003). The country had large current account deficits problems at the beginning 
of 1990s. The current account deficit in 1990 was 8.25% of GDP. The country 
suspended its principal and interest on its hard currency debt. The size of the 
current account imbalance in 1996 and in 1997 was modest as a share of GDP. 
In early 1997, a serious economic and financial crisis broke out. GDP 
collapsed, the risk of hyperinflation came into being and the gross foreign 
reserves decreased to USD 500 mio at the end of 1996. The country risked a 
foreign debt crisis at the beginning of 1997 (Roubini and Watchel,1998). A 
financial support program was introduced by IMF in the same year. The 
stabilization started to take place with the help of the IMF program at the end of 
1997. FDI rose to 7.92% of GDP in 2000 and 7% in 2003. Current account 
deficit widened due to the increase in the investments during these years. In the 
meantime, external debt increased to 68% of GDP in 2004 and short-term 
external debt to 28% in 2004 from 12% in 2001. Debt service problem was 
continuing to put on pressure to the economy. External deficit had been 
financing with the high FDIs which helped also to a jump in the foreign 
exchange reserves. 
While looking at the structural features of current account sustainability 
indicators in the country, it can be said that GDP growth rate has been 
increasing after the crisis periods and has caught a stable trend during 2000s. A 
higher GDP growth rate shows that a country can sustain a higher current 
account deficit. Thus, the current account/GDP ratio will decrease and the 
country’s ability to pay will continue to rise.  
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Table  5.1:  Bulgaria’s current account position 
CRISIS PERIODS           
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
CA/GDP (%) -4,39 -24,69 -0,41 -0,2 0,16 4,12 
 
NON-CRISIS 
PERIODS                 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CA/GDP(%) -0,48 -5,03 -5,59 -5,63 -2,44 -5,51 -6,59 -12,40
 
Source: Data was obtained from World Bank , IMF and Bulgarian National 
Bank  
One of the other important components of current account sustainability is 
foreign investment. Net FDI inflows into Bulgaria have been rising since the 
beginning of the 1990’s especially after the EU accession. Higher foreign 
investment can sometimes have negative effects and can increase a crisis 
probability in the country. On the one hand, high dependence on the foreign 
portfolio will leave the country open to the global financial instabilities. On the 
other hand, short- term FDIs can have negative effects on the current account 
sustainability. 
Real export/GDP ratio has been always at satisfactory level since the beginning 
of the 1990s. The ratio reached the peak level in 1994 with 94.54% and had a 
minimum in 1993 with 43.40%. Higher real export/GDP rate means that a 
country is able to pay more debt.  
The country’s real external debt/GDP ratio has been always very high 
especially in 1992, 1993 and 1994 with the 160.58%, 127.79% and 116.79% 
levels respectively. This reflects that Bulgaria has an unsustainable external 
position. The composition of the debt and availability of the FX reserves should 
also be considered. If most of the debts are short-term, the country becomes 
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more vulnerable to a crisis situation. Additionally, a low FX reserves/external 
debt ratio makes the country more delicate to crisis. 
Referring to the macroeconomic indicators, Bulgaria’s inflation rate became 
hyper in the crisis year 1997. The rate has been always high in the non-crisis 
years as well. High inflation rate causes uncertainty and declines the value of 
the national currency. This situation affects the country’s international 
competitiveness and leads an unsustainable current account. 
After becoming an EU member state, Bulgaria has experienced a high 
performance on economic growth. However, in 2008 crisis, real GDP growth 
decreased due to the falls in domestic demand and exports. As far as annual 
percentage change in GDP as compared to previous year prices, 6 % growth 
rate has decreased to -1.6%. According to Euro stat estimations, in 2010, the 
percentage will be -0.1 (Economic Forecast, 2009). Similarly, domestic demand 
has fallen from 9.4% change in 2008 to -4.4% in 2009. Following with the 
considerable decline in FDI and low credit growth compared with 2007, 
Bulgaria’s gross fixed capital formation change has become stable around 20% 
in 2008 but decreased by -12.7% in 2009. 
Considering the trade balance, the current account balance seems significantly 
stable even though these indicators remain negative. In 2008, annual percentage 
change in trade balance was -25.8% and in 2009 -19.9%. Similarly, in 2008, 
annual change in current account balance was -24.8% and in 2009 -18.8%. 
Therefore, recovery in the trade balance and current account balance has 
contradicted with other financial and economic indicators that cause the 
economic downturn. 
 
5.2.  Czech Republic 
Towards the end of 1990s, an unsustainable high current account deficit and a 
considerable slowing down in growth in Czech Republic created an 
environment in which political instability, contagious effects and shift in 
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expectations resulted in currency crisis (Sujan and Sujanova, 1993). In 1994-
1995, 38% of banking system loans were non-performing ( Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 2003). In that sense, unlike other transition economies, which 
experienced large current account deficits after the collapse of the Soviet 
system, the Czech Republic’s current account exhibited relatively small 
surpluses and deficits in the 1990s, especially due to high investment demand 
over “inefficient” private savings rather than public saving (Horvath, 2009). At 
the beginning of the transition period (1990-1993), current account deficits 
were floating. The negative growth rate of output caused a drop in the 
investment and saving rates. The country had a current account surplus in 1993. 
GDP growth in 1994 ensured an increase in the savings and investment rates. 
The increase in the investment rate was larger than the increase in the savings 
rates which resulted in current account deficits in 1994 and 1995. In 1996, the 
current account deficit rose to 6.75% of GDP. In 1997, current account 
imbalance problem became significant and in May 1997, the central bank 
abandoned its exchange rate peg. Current account deficits between 1994-1997 
were financed by external debt which rose to 26% of GDP in 1994 to 41% in 
1997. Economic reform package helped to reduce the current account 
imbalance from its unsustainable level in 1998 and 1999.  
In 1998, Czech Republic started the accession negotiations with EU. In 2000-
2002 period, the current account increased due to the fall in saving rates and it 
is mainly financed by increased FDI inflows. In 2003, current account deficit 
reached 6.3% of GDP due to the high outflows income from FDI. The country 
started to finance its external debit from non-FDI sources as the privatization 
activity became slower. Saving rates decreased in 2003 and IMF advised the 
government to apply new policies to increase savings in 2005. Increasing 
exports and related investment helped to sustain the low current account deficit 
in 2004, 2005 and 2006. The country’s inflation rate has not been problematic 
comparing to Bulgaria’s and has been ruling at low levels after 1993. 
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Table  5.2:  Czech Republic’s current account position 
CRISIS PERIODS             
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
CA/GDP (%) -0,16 1,24 -1,85 -2,49 -6,66 -6,34 
 
NON-CRISIS 
PERIODS                 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CA/GDP (%) 2,12 -2,43 -4,74 -5,29 -5,66 -6,33 -5,25 -1,34
Source: Data was obtained from World Bank , IMF and Czech National Bank. 
The current account balance is negative especially since 2008 which has also 
impacts on high general government balance and high unemployment. The 
effects of the 2008 financial crisis has been felt deeply on external trade with 
the percentage change in exports of goods and services in 2009 as -11.6% and 
imports of goods and services in the same year as -10.4%. The export 
performance of Czech companies is being driven down by the collapse of 
external demand and export growth is thus anticipated to contract by around 
11.6 % in 2009. The trade surplus is anticipated to decline, yet the 2010 
estimation remains positive (Economic Forecast, 2009). The economic 
downturn has a strong impact on the labor market with the production sector 
particularly affected by unemployment. As such, unemployment has been rising 
at the end of 2008 and this increasing trend is expected to continue in 2009 and 
2010.  
As far as the vulnerabilities of the country, the year 2008 represents a general 
government deficit that is indicated as 1.5 % of GDP. In 2009, public finances 
are set to deteriorate due to the downturn in the economy. 
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5.3. Hungary 
Following the process of macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform 
during the 1990s, Hungary’s economic performance has improved. Referring to 
the favorable external developments, the country held a considerable success in 
structural policies and economic indicators. However, since the transition 
period has not yet been over, the country is open to external vulnerabilities in 
the case of external economic downturns. Therefore, apart from current account 
deficits, the country suffered from “output shocks” (Cottarelli, 1998) and thus 
external and internal debt crisis (Kornai, 1997).  
The positive current account balance status of Hungary had deteriorated 
between the years 1993-1995. The fall in output caused a sharp decline in 
national savings with the transition to the market economy. An austerity 
program was launched by the government in 1995. Saving rates rose to 19%. 
By the second half of 1993, eight banks ( with 25% of the financial system 
assets) were accepted as insolvent ( Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003). The 
investment rate remained at 23% and the current account deficit sustained with 
the increase in saving rates until 1997. Investments were accelerated with the 
start of the EU accession talks in 1998 and reached 31% in 2000.  
In 2003, due to the significant structural reforms, privatization efforts, 
increasing FDI, strong export performance and accurate banking system, the 
country’ economy started to become more resistant to the external 
vulnerabilities. Wage increases in the public sector together with the national 
currency appreciation aggravated external competitiveness. 2003 GDP growth 
was the result of the domestic consumption. Current account deficit widened. 
The external debt was high as a share of GDP. 
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Table 5.3:  Hungary’s current account position 
CRISIS PERIODS             
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
CA/GDP (%) 0,95 -11,04 -9,77 -3,67 -3,91 -4,48 
 
NON-CRISIS 
PERIODS                 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CA/GDP (%) -7,23 -7,83 -8,37 -6,02 -6,98 -7,95 -8,42 -7,52
 
Source: Data was obtained from World Bank , IMF and National Bank of 
Hungary. 
Considering the structural features of current account sustainability indicators 
in the country, GDP growth rate has been increasing after the crisis periods. Net 
FDI inflows into Hungary have been following an increasing trend especially 
during the EU accession talks period. Real export/GDP ratio was not at 
satisfactory level until the end of 1990s but accelerated with the start of the EU 
accession talks. Real external debt/GDP ratio has not been at an alarming level 
in the non-crisis periods. Hungary’s inflation rate was in two digits between the 
years 1992-1999. After 2000, the rate has caught a stable trend with one digit. 
Following a stable growth pattern during the 2000s, in 2009, the country faced 
with the shocks of 2008 global crisis, with -6.3 % changes in GDP growth rate. 
However, in light of this decrease, current account balance seems to recover 
itself as compared to the previous year. In 2008, the change in current account 
balance was -8.4 percent; but, in 2009, it was -5.0 %, which represent a 
decrease in current account deficit.  
More importantly, for the year 2009, it is necessary to refer to the indicators of 
gross fixed capital formation (-10.6% as compared to -2.6% in 2008) as well as 
trade indicators. In other words, exports indicators of goods and services in 
2009 turned into negative numbers (-11.9%) in the same way of imports (-
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12.3%). Therefore, similar to the Czech Republic, Hungary’s confrontation 
with the 2008 financial crisis is mostly correlated to trade balances. 
In light of this observation, it can be argued that current account deficit is not 
the remarkable crisis indicator, which gives its place to trade indicators. Labor 
demand is likely to be reduced significantly on the way of economic recession. 
The decrease in private sector employment is expected to be 3% annually. 
Therefore, unemployment is likely to rise by 1.7 %.  
Nevertheless, the increasing negative output is accompanied with the price 
inflation and the weakening exchange rate. Besides, the decrease of 6.4 % in 
domestic demand might affect not only private consumption (with the decrease 
of 6.6 %) and low sustainability of this weakness with general government 
gross debt of 80.8 as % of GDP.  
 
5.4. Romania 
Romania experienced major banking crises in 1990 and in 1997 with the 
transition to a market economy. This transition period caused the deterioration 
of the current account balance. The country had a high external deficit problem 
in the crisis years. In 1993-1994, the current account balance was improved. A 
structural reform program including the tightening of monetary policy, 
liberalization of the official exchange rate and acceleration of privatization was 
launched after the crisis. However, the country suffered from problems in 
accommodating monetary policy (Crespo-Cuaresma, 2005). Therefore, the fall 
in real GDP and the rise of inflation led to significant difficulties with the 
repayment of foreign debt. Nevertheless, with the strong demand in EU export 
markets, since 2001, the GDP growth has started to increase. 
To discuss the structural features of the current account sustainability in 
Romania, the remarkable indicators, GDP growth rate and external debt should 
be considered. GDP growth seemed to be recovered after the 1990 crisis until 
the sharp decline in 1997. Afterwards, the growth rate took a stable trend in the 
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2000s. External debt has been increasing rapidly in the non-crisis years. Current 
account deficit has been financing with the FDIs. Inflation rates ranged from 
over 150% to over 250% during crisis years. In the non-crisis periods, the rates 
were significantly lower. 
Similar to the general outline of transition countries observed so far, Romania 
also provides an example on the parallel relationship between current account 
deficit and further crisis indicators. Although current account deficit seems to 
be a chronic problem in the country, the account imbalances become recovered 
during the crisis. If FDIs continue to be at the 2005’s levels, current account 
deficit can be considered as sustainable. 
Table 5.4:  Romania’s current account position 
CRISIS PERIODS             
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
CA/GDP (%) -7,75 -4,7 -1,72 -4,47 -6,65 -5,4 
 
NON-CRISIS 
PERIODS                 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CA/GDP (%) -7,1 -4,12 -3,7 -5,49 -3,33 -5,82 -8,36 -8,88
 
Source: Data was obtained from World Bank , IMF and  National Bank of 
Romania. 
Net exports maintain the positive position and contribution to growth, coupled 
with weak demand due to the stagnant economic performances of EU internal 
market. Therefore, net external borrowing is expected to decrease by 11,8 % of 
GDP in 2008 and in 2009 this rate will increase to -6,5 %. 
Regarding the further crisis indicators, the budget deficit was 5,4 % of GDP in 
2008 (more than 2,5 % of GDP in 2008). The deficit is estimated to decline to 
5,1 % of GDP in 2009. Similarly, following the decline in economic activity, 
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unemployment is expected to rise from a record low of 5 % in 2008 to about 8 
% in both 2009 and 2010 while inflationary pressures decreased in 2009 on the 
back of downturn in global markets and commodity prices, inflation raised in 
2009 (by 5, 8 %). 
 
5.5. Russia 
The collapse of the Soviet regime at the end of the 1980s resulted in the 
economic slowdown experienced by the Soviet bloc countries in the following 
years. The transition to the market economy had been very difficult for Russia 
as the country was the first to launch into this new economic formation 
(Svejnar, 2002). 
In 1998, Russian Government's short-term external financing needs revealed a 
balance sheet vulnerability that resulted in the failure to implement budget 
deficit as well as terms of trade deterioration (Ghosh, 2006). Moreover, the 
poor fiscal performance coupled with a weak tax administration due to 
corruption lead to unsuccessful attempts to control expenditures and taxes 
(Antezak, 2003 in Dabrowski, 2003). Russia’s currency crisis resulted in the 
devaluation of the ruble and the default in public and private debt (Chiodo and 
Owyang, 2002). 
Russia generated sustained economic growth in the non-crisis periods. The 
country suffered GDP decline until 1996. In 1997, some signs of growth had 
been recognized but in 1998, the growth rate had decreased to -5.3%. The 
inflation rate was in triple digit during 1993, 1994 and 1995. By 1996, the rate 
had declined until the 1998 financial crisis. After this sharp rise, Russia’s 
inflation started to follow a decreasing trend (excluding the year 2001 with a 
slight increase). Russia is an important exporter of natural resources, 
experiencing net outflows of investment funds. This is the main reason of their 
current account surpluses. Most of the transition countries started the 1990s 
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with high indebtness ratios. Russia’s external debt was 91.38% of GDP in 1992. 
By the mid-1990s the country reduced its debt relative to GDP. The increasing 
trend seemed to be restarted in 1998 and Russia defaulted its sovereign debt in 
the same year. Since 2001, the ratio has been declining. This level of debt is not 
alarming but high level of short-term debt of the country should be considered 
(Svejnar, 2002). FDI inflows have been rising gradually since 1994. FDI 
inflows/GDP ratio has been fluctuating between the minimum 02.5 percent and 
the maximum 2.69 percent interval. 
Table 5.5:  Russia’s current account position 
CRISIS PERIODS             
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
CA/GDP (%) -0,02 0,08 12,57 18,04 11,07 8,44 
Source: Data was obtained from World Bank and IMF. 
 
5.6. Slovenia 
The Slovenian transition of the 1990s was characterized by a gradual approach 
to a market economy. The most important reforms were stabilization of the 
economy, liberalization of trade and increased market competition. Unlike 
Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, the Yugoslav socialist 
system experimented with different forms of a decentralized economy, based on 
the self-management of employees in socially-owned firms (Prasnikar, et,al,, 
2002). After the Privatization Law was passed, Slovenia established a system of 
NON-CRISIS 
PERIODS                 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2003 2004 2005
CA/GDP (%) -1,4 1,41 2,83 2,22 2,77 8,21 10,06 11,05
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privatization based on firms’ initiatives and the transparent operation of 
regulatory institutions, such as Privatization Agency, Development Fund. 
Slovenia’s current account deficits were at low levels at the beginning of the 
1990s. The country had a current account surplus in 2001 and 2002. At the 
same years, FDIs were considerably high comparing to the other years’ inflows. 
Current account position has worsened since 2004 but never been at critical 
levels. GDP growth rate of the country has been always at satisfactory levels 
and this positive trend has been continuing in the 2000s. The same trend has 
been observed in FX reserves ratios as well. Rising inflows and high FX 
reserves helped the country to keep the current account low. The inflation rate 
reached the peak level in 1993 and started to decline in the following years 
excluding the years 2000 and 2001 with low increase. 
Table 5.6: Slovenia’s current account position 
CRISIS PERIODS             
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
CA/GDP (%) 5,79 1,74 4,26 -1,48 0,27 0,32 
 
NON-CRISIS 
PERIODS                 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CA/GDP (%) -0,72 -3,95 -3,16 0,18 1,07 -0,78 -2,66 -1,73
Source: Data was obtained from World Bank , IMF and Bank of Slovenia. 
 
5.7. Turkey 
In 1989, with the full liberalization of capital account movements and removal 
of the controls over foreign exchange transactions, Turkish economy has 
entered in a new period. Until 2001, unstable and low growth rates, large fiscal 
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deficits, high public sector debt, high inflation rates and dollarization were the 
main characteristics of the economy. 1994 and 2001 balance of payments crises 
increased the vulnerability of the economy. These crises were mostly related to 
short-term capital inflow, liquidity shortage, exchange rate based inflation, 
unsustainable trade and current account deficits, financial fragility and external 
vulnerability (Boratav and Yeldan, 2006; Akyüz and Boratav, 2003; Voyvoda 
and Yeldan, 2002; Yeldan, 2002; Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 2001; Eichengreen, 
2001; Alper, 2001). 
The country suffered two financial crises in 1994 and 2001. High current 
account deficits have been associated with these crises. Özatay (2000) states 
that high current account deficits in Turkey were not a trend prior to these 
crises, but rather a one-shot problem. Since 2002, with the high growth rates, 
the current account deficit has raised both in nominal terms and as a share of 
GDP. The import dependency of the economy also increased, turning current 
account deficits into a chronic structural problem (Onaran, 2006). Starting the 
early 1990s, Turkey has experienced high current account deficits, with the 
figure in 2007 reaching an increase by -5.8 %. 
Table 5.7:   Turkey’s current account position 
CRISIS PERIODS 
1994 
crisis     
2001 
crisis       
  1992 1993 1994 1998 1999 2000 2001 
CA/GDP (%) -0,46 -3,21 0,29 0,80 -0,37 -3,72 1,92 
 
NON-CRISIS 
PERIODS               
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CA/GDP(%) -0,27 -2,48 -3,68 -4,59 -6,03 -5,81 -5,66 
 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
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Even though the high increases in the current account deficit after 2002, its 
reason and its financing should be taken into consideration to evaluate the 
current account sustainability. Before 2001, the negative public savings- 
investment gap was increasing continuously. After 2001, this gap has started to 
decrease and become positive together with a change in private sector savings-
investment gap. Additionally, before 2001 crisis, total domestic savings and 
investments followed a downward path. The implementation of the tight 
monetary and fiscal policies, accompanied with the high growth rates, has 
resulted in a jump in total domestic investments relative to the increase in total 
domestic savings. This is the main reason of the high current account deficits in 
the recent years. 
It is examined that the share of consumption goods in total imports has been 
always limited and the increase in imports has been due the imports of 
investment and intermediate goods. This situation has caused the rise in 
domestic production capacity of Turkey which has helped to sustain the current 
account deficit. Babaoğlu (2005) has argued that the sectors in which these 
imported investment and intermediate goods are used are also very important. 
High investment in non-tradable goods’ sectors raises domestic demand but 
does not develop the productive capacity in exporting and in import- competing 
sectors. However, private sector investment in tradable goods’ sectors assists in 
the reduction of current account deficit (World Bank, 2008). World Bank 
(2008) emphasizes a significant shift in the composition of investment towards 
tradable sector in Turkey has taken place since 2001. Compared to the new EU 
members, the amount is still low but this can be considered a positive progress 
for the sustainability of current account deficits in Turkey. 
Referring to the current account stability indicators, it can be concluded that 
GDP growth rate had been negative during the crisis periods. This rate has 
always showing an upward trend during non-crisis periods. Poor FX reserves/ 
external debt ratio which was less than 10% prior to 1994 crisis implied 
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significant vulnerability. Macroeconomic instability was due to the high 
inflation rates at the beginning of the 1990s. Net FDI inflows into the country 
were at very low levels at the beginning of the 1990s. Except the crisis periods,  
FDIs has reached an acceptable level in the 2000s. Real external debt/GDP ratio 
had jumped during the crisis years and reached a maximum level of 75.52% in 
the 2001 crisis. Real export/GDP ratio started to increase after 1994 crisis and 
has been fluctuating between 19% and 7% interval. 
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6. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Based on empirical literature, a model is constructed for describing factors that 
have impacts on current account balance. CAD has been accepted as a crisis 
signal by many economists. The regression analysis study gets CAD as percent 
of GDP as dependent variable and all the other variables are explanatory 
(independent) variables.  
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) analyzed the countries that faced large and 
persistent current account deficits and identified the key factors that led them to 
crises. Referring to their work, the following variables are accepted as 
explanatory variables in this study: 
• GDP Growth Rate: Gross domestic product growth rate as percentage. 
• Inflation Rate Change: Annual inflation rate as percentage(inflation rate 
change is not determinded as an indicator in Milesi-Ferretti and Razin’s 
work, we added this indicator as this is an important segment of 
macroeconomic stability). 
• Export/GDP: Total annual exports as percentage of GDP. 
• Net FDI Flows/GDP: Net foreign direct investments flows as percentage 
of GDP. 
• External Debt/GDP: Real external debt as percentage of GDP. 
• FX Reserves/External Debt: Foreign exchange reserves as percentage of 
external debt. 
The model will look as follows: 
Y = α +β1 X1 + β2 X2+ β3 X3 + β4 X4 + β5 X5 + β6 X6 
Y = CA (% of GDP) 
X1 = GDP Growth Rate (%) 
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X2 = Inflation Rate Change (%) 
X3 = Exports/GDP (%) 
X4 = Net FDI Inflows/GDP (%) 
X5 = External Debt/GDP (%) 
X6 = FX Reserves/External Debt (%) 
The study uses annual data covering the period from 1992 to 2005 for 
CA/GDP, GDP growth rate, inflation rate change, export/GDP, net FDI 
inflows/GDP, external debt/GDP, FX reserves/external debt. 
The analysis contains three steps: tests of normality with Kolmogorov–
Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk, Pearson correlation analysis and multiple regression 
analysis with SPSS. 
Normal distribution hypothesis is tested for each group: 
H0: Data shows normal distribution. 
H1: Data does not show normal distribution. 
SPSS results: 
Test of Normality table is reviewed to test the normality. In each group, the 
result variable is tested to designate if this is normally distributed or not with 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Shapiro Wilk tests. Shapiro-Wilk test is usually 
preferred because it is a more powerful test. According to Shapiro-Wilk results 
for all groups p is >0.05 (H0 can not be rejected). Normal distribution is 
obtained. 
α = constant. 
β = coefficient values in the regression equation. 
SE β = Standard errors of the coefficient values in the regression equation. 
t = t values of the coefficient values in the regression equation. 
Sig. t = t values of the coefficient values in the regression equation and 
significance tests of these t values. 
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• BULGARIA: 
 
 
Table 6.1: Tests of Normality for Bulgaria 
 
GROUP 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
GDP GROWTH 
RATE (%) ,246 14 ,021 ,867 14 ,078 
INFLATION RATE 
(% change) ,395 13 0 ,620 13 ,080 
CA (% of GDP) ,263 14 ,01 ,820 14 ,059 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 ,233 14 ,038 ,765 14 ,072 
NET FDI 
INFLOWS/GDP (%) ,153 14 ,200(*) ,925 14 ,263 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT/GDP (%) ,336 14 0 ,809 14 ,066 
FX RESERVES/ 
EXTERNAL DEBT 
(%) 
,178 14 ,200(*) ,890 14 ,080 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
A Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Table 6.2: Results of the multiple regression analysis (for variables) for 
Bulgaria 
 
Variables β SE β t Sig.  t 
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP (%) 
 -,379 ,138 -2,747 ,002 
INFLATION RATE (%) 
 ,004 ,004 ,807 ,440 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%)
 -,460 ,419 -1,097 ,301 
 
CONSTANT 34,846 14,310 2,435 ,038 
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Table 6.3: Correlation Table for Bulgaria 
 
    
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
Inf. Rate   
(% change)
Exports/GDP 
(%) 
Net FDI Inflows/ 
GDP (%) 
External 
Debt/GDP(%)
FX 
Reserves/External 
Debt (%) 
CA Balance/ 
GDP (%) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -0,348 0,013 ,808** -,550* ,913** 0,124 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,244 0,965 0 0,042 0 0,673 GDP Growth Rate (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,348 1 0,03 0,025 0,1 -0,055 0,121 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,244   0,924 0,935 0,745 0,859 0,693 
Inf. Rate 
 (% change) 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation 0,013 0,03 1 -0,137 0,182 -0,202 0,236 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,965 0,924   0,641 0,533 0,488 0,417 
Exports/GDP 
(%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation ,808** 0,025 -0,137 1 -0,374 ,885** -0,132 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,935 0,641   0,187 0 0,654 
Net FDI 
Inflows/GDP 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -,550* 0,1 0,182 -0,374 1 -0,494 -0,346 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,042 0,745 0,533 0,187   0,073 0,225 
External 
Debt/GDP 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation ,913** -0,055 -0,202 ,885** -0,494 1 0,059 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,859 0,488 0 0,073   0,842 
FX Reserves/ 
External Debt 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,124 0,121 0,236 -0,132 -0,346 0,059 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,673 0,693 0,417 0,654 0,225 0,842   
CA 
Balance/GDP 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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We added only the variables that have a significant t into the equation: 
Y= 34,846 -0,379 *X5  
Y = CA (% of GDP) 
α = constant 
X5 = External Debt/GDP (%) 
R2 is calculated as 0,474. The independent variables contribute the dependent 
variable with a percentage of 48,00%. This means that the independent 
variables are explaining the variation in the dependent variable by very low 
level. To test the general significance, F-test is determined as 2,702. This value 
is smaller than the value in the F table. Thus, it is concluded that the equation is 
insignificant. 
 
• CZECH REPUBLIC: 
 
Table 6.4: Tests of Normality for Czech Republic 
 
GROUP 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
GDP GROWTH RATE 
(%) ,120 14 ,200(*) ,964 14 ,795 
INFLATION RATE  
(% change) ,169 13 ,200(*) ,932 13 ,359 
CA (% of GDP) 
 ,196 14 ,148 ,910 14 ,158 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 ,183 14 ,200(*) ,902 14 ,122 
NET FDI 
INFLOWS/GDP (%) ,182 14 ,200(*) ,869 14 ,071 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT/GDP (%) ,128 13 ,200(*) ,943 13 ,495 
FX RESERVES/ 
EXTERNAL DEBT(%) ,185 13 ,200(*) ,963 13 ,792 
 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
A Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table 6.5: Results of the multiple regression analysis (for variables) for 
Czech Republic 
 
Variables β SE β t Sig.  t 
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP 
(%) -,148 ,178 -,827 ,430 
FX RESERVES/ 
EXTERNAL DEBT (%) -,134 ,073 -1,842 ,004 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP 
(%) 
 
,299 ,303 ,990 ,348 
 
CONSTANT 7,891 7,759 1,017 ,336 
 
 
 
We added only the variables that have a significant t into the equation: 
Y = 7,891- 0,134* X6 
Y = CA (% of GDP) 
α = constant 
X6 = FX Reserves/External Debt (%) 
R2 is calculated as 0,281. The independent variables contribute the dependent 
variable with a percentage of 28 %. This means that the independent variables 
are explaining the variation in the dependent variable by very low level. To test 
the general significance, F-test is determined as 1,170. This value is smaller 
than the value in the F table. Thus, it is concluded that the equation is 
insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
57
Table 6.6: Correlation Table for Czech Republic 
 
    
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
Inf. Rate   
(% change)
Exports/    
GDP  (%)
Net FDI Inflows/ 
GDP (%) 
External 
Debt/GDP(%)
FX Reserves/External 
Debt (%) 
CA Balance/ 
GDP (%) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -0,16 0,363 0,123 -0,41 0,452 -0,295 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,601 0,202 0,676 0,165 0,121 0,305 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) N 14 13 14 14 13 13 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,16 1 0,13 -0,284 -0,297 -0,211 0,206 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,601   0,673 0,347 0,324 0,49 0,499 
Inf. Rate  
(% change)
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation 0,363 0,13 1 ,548* -0,183 0,322 -0,244 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,202 0,673   0,042 0,55 0,283 0,4 
Exports/ 
GDP (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 13 13 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,123 -0,284 ,548* 1 0,433 0,42 -0,076 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,676 0,347 0,042   0,139 0,153 0,796 
Net FDI 
Inflows/ 
GDP (%) N 14 13 14 14 13 13 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,41 -0,297 -0,183 0,433 1 -0,166 -0,02 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,165 0,324 0,55 0,139   0,589 0,948 
External 
Debt/GDP 
(%) N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation 0,452 -0,211 0,322 0,42 -0,166 1 -0,432 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,121 0,49 0,283 0,153 0,589   0,141 
FX 
Reserves/ 
External 
Debt (%) N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation -0,295 0,206 -0,244 -0,076 -0,02 -0,432 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,305 0,499 0,4 0,796 0,948 0,141   
CA 
Balance/ 
GDP (%) N 14 13 14 14 13 13 14 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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• HUNGARY: 
 
Table 6.7: Tests of Normality for Hungary 
 
GROUP 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 ,272 14 ,006 ,747 14 ,071
INFLATION RATE (% change) 
 ,218 13 ,090 ,798 13 ,082
CA (% of GDP) ,330 14 ,000 ,747 14 ,081
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 ,238 14 ,030 ,871 14 ,063
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) 
 ,146 14 ,200(*) ,962 14 ,749
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP (%) 
 ,178 14 ,200(*) ,962 14 ,762
FX RESERVES/EXTERNAL 
DEBT (%) ,230 14 ,043 ,910 14 ,159
 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
    a Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Referring to the Hungary correlation table, we have excluded from the 
regression analysis Inflation Rate, Exports/GDP and Net FDI Inflows/GDP 
variables as their correlations are not significant and FX Reserves/External 
Debt variable as its correlation is higher than 75%. 
Table 6.8: Results of the multiple regression analysis (for variables) for 
Hungary 
Variables β SE β t Sig.  t 
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 ,871 1,118 ,779 ,452 
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP (%)
 -,299 ,263 -1,135 ,280 
CONSTANT 45,364 16,118 2,814 ,017 
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According to the results of the analysis, none of the regressed variables is 
statistically significant. We do not include any of them to the regression 
equation. R2 is calculated as 0.186. The independent variables contribute the 
dependent variable with a percentage of 19.00%. This means that the 
independent variables are explaining the variation in the dependent variable by 
very low level. 
 
• ROMANIA: 
 
Table 6.9: Tests of Normality for Romania 
 
GROUP 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 ,222 14 ,060 ,895 14 ,095
INFLATION RATE  (% change)
 ,283 13 ,005 ,883 13 ,078
CA (% of GDP) ,088 14 ,200(*) ,982 14 ,986
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 ,198 14 ,142 ,915 14 ,189
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) 
 ,203 14 ,122 ,884 14 ,067
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP (%) 
 ,142 14 ,200(*) ,916 14 ,194
FX RESERVES/EXTERNAL 
DEBT (%) ,166 14 ,200(*) ,926 14 ,269
 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
A Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Referring to the Table 6.12., we have excluded from the regression analysis 
Exports/GDP and External Debt/GDP variables as their correlations are higher 
than 75%. 
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Table 6.10: Correlation Table for Hungary 
 
    
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
Inf. Rate   
(% change)
Exports/ 
GDP (%) 
Net FDI Inflows/ 
GDP (%) 
External 
Debt/GDP(%)
FX Reserves/External 
Debt (%) 
CA Balance/ 
GDP (%) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -0,039 ,729** 0,225 -0,255 ,718** 0,301 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,9 0,003 0,439 0,379 0,004 0,296 GDP Growth Rate (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,039 1 -0,11 0,289 0,147 0,346 0,098 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,9   0,72 0,338 0,631 0,246 0,75 Inf. Rate    (% change) 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation ,729** -0,11 1 0,155 -,548* ,789** 0,416 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,003 0,72   0,598 0,042 0,001 0,139 Exports/ GDP (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,225 0,289 0,155 1 0,473 0,291 0,021 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,439 0,338 0,598   0,087 0,312 0,943 
Net FDI 
Inflows/ 
GDP (%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,255 0,147 -,548* 0,473 1 -0,384 -0,375 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,379 0,631 0,042 0,087   0,175 0,186 
External 
Debt/GDP 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation ,718** 0,346 ,789** 0,291 -0,384 1 0,253 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,004 0,246 0,001 0,312 0,175   0,382 
FX Reserves/ 
External 
Debt (%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,301 0,098 0,416 0,021 -0,375 0,253 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,296 0,75 0,139 0,943 0,186 0,382   CA Balance/GDP (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.11: Results of the multiple regression analysis (for variables) for 
Romania 
 
Variables β SE β t Sig.  t 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%)
 -,606 ,184 -3,295 ,002 
INFLATION RATE (%) -,006 ,007 -,799 ,443 
CONSTANT -3,534 ,730 -4,844 ,001 
 
 
We added only the variables that have a significant t into the equation: 
Y = - 3,534 – 0,606* X4 
Y = CA (% of GDP) 
α = constant 
X4 = Net FDI Inflows/GDP (%) 
R2 is calculated as 0,547. The independent variables contribute the dependent 
variable with a percentage of 55,00%. This means that the independent 
variables are explaining the variation in the dependent variable by satisfactory 
level. To test the general significance, F-test is determined as 6,047. This value 
is bigger than the value in the F table. Thus, it is concluded that the equation is 
significant. 
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        Table 6.12: Correlation Table for Romania 
 
    
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
Inf. Rate   
(% change)
Exports/
GDP (%)
Net FDI Inflows/ 
GDP (%) 
External 
Debt/GDP(%)
FX 
Reserves/External 
Debt (%) 
CA Balance/ 
GDP (%) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -0,316 0,486 0,226 0,454 0,304 0,159 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,292 0,078 0,437 0,103 0,291 0,588 
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,316 1 0,257 0,094 0,264 0,147 -0,236 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,292   0,397 0,761 0,384 0,633 0,437 
Inf. Rate  
(% change) 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation 0,486 0,257 1 0,529 ,898** 0,519 -0,193 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,078 0,397   0,052 0 0,057 0,508 Exports/GDP (%)
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,226 0,094 0,529 1 ,750** ,728** -,552* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,437 0,761 0,052   0,002 0,003 0,041 Net FDI Inflows/GDP (%)
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,454 0,264 ,898** ,750** 1 ,691** -0,328 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,103 0,384 0 0,002   0,006 0,252 External Debt/GDP (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,304 0,147 0,519 ,728** ,691** 1 -0,419 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,291 0,633 0,057 0,003 0,006   0,136 
FX 
Reserves/External 
Debt (%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,159 -0,236 -0,193 -,552* -0,328 -0,419 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,588 0,437 0,508 0,041 0,252 0,136   CA Balance/GDP (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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• RUSSIA: 
 
Table 6.13: Tests of Normality for Russia 
 
GROUP 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 ,231 13 ,055 ,903 13 ,145
INFLATION RATE (% change) 
 ,305 12 ,003 ,627 12 ,056
CA (% of GDP) ,219 14 ,067 ,924 14 ,251
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 ,446 14 ,000 ,425 14 ,089
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) 
 ,162 14 ,200(*) ,943 14 ,463
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP (%) 
 ,223 14 ,057 ,850 14 ,082
FX RESERVES/EXTERNAL 
DEBT (%) ,232 13 ,055 ,817 13 ,091
 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
A Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Table 6.14:  Results of the multiple regression analysis (for variables) for 
Russia 
 
 
Variables β SE β t Sig.  t 
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP (%) 
 ,108 ,044 2,460 ,036 
INFLATION RATE (% change)
 -,018 ,006 -2,845 ,004 
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) ,882 ,135 6,554 ,000 
CONSTANT -,585 2,444 -,239 ,816 
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We added only the variables that have a significant t into the equation: 
Y = -0,585+ 0,882* X1- 0,018* X2  
Y = CA (% of GDP) 
α = constant 
X1 = GDP Growth Rate (%) 
X2 = Inflation Rate Change (%) 
R2 is calculated as 0,848. The independent variables contribute the dependent 
variable with a percentage of 85,00%. This means that the independent 
variables are explaining the variation in the dependent variable by very high 
level. To test the general significance, F-test is determined as 16,722. This 
value is bigger than the value in the F table. Thus, it is concluded that the 
equation is significant. 
 
 
• SLOVENIA: 
 
Table 6.15: Tests of Normality for Slovenia 
 
 
GROUP 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 ,148 13 ,200(*) ,929 13 ,333
INFLATION RATE (% change) 
 ,300 12 ,004 ,842 12 ,070
CA (% of GDP) ,158 14 ,200(*) ,947 14 ,517
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 ,112 14 ,200(*) ,990 14 ,999
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) 
 ,275 14 ,005 ,599 14 ,096
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP (%) 
 ,187 13 ,200(*) ,934 13 ,382
FX RESERVES/EXTERNAL 
DEBT (%) ,146 13 ,200(*) ,968 13 ,864
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
A Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Table 6.16: Correlation Table for Russia 
 
    
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
Inf. Rate   
(% change)
Exports/
GDP (%) 
Net FDI 
Inflows/ 
GDP (%) 
External 
Debt/GDP(%)
FX 
Reserves/External 
Debt (%) 
CA Balance/ 
GDP (%) 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,751** -0,351 ,720** 0,042 ,595* ,813** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,005 0,239 0,005 0,892 0,032 0,001 
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
N 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation ,751** 1 -0,323 ,612* 0,229 0,346 0,34 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,005   0,306 0,034 0,474 0,27 0,279 
Inf. Rate 
 (% change) 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Pearson Correlation -0,351 -0,323 1 0,032 ,610* -0,001 -0,383 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,239 0,306   0,914 0,021 0,997 0,177 Exports/GDP (%) 
N 13 12 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation ,720** ,612* 0,032 1 0,043 ,720** 0,388 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,005 0,034 0,914   0,884 0,004 0,171 Net FDI Inflows/GDP (%) 
N 13 12 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,042 0,229 ,610* 0,043 1 -0,354 -0,012 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,892 0,474 0,021 0,884   0,215 0,967 External Debt/GDP (%) 
N 13 12 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation ,595* 0,346 -0,001 ,720** -0,354 1 0,391 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,032 0,27 0,997 0,004 0,215   0,167 
FX 
Reserves/External 
Debt (%) N 13 12 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation ,813** 0,34 -0,383 0,388 -0,012 0,391 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,001 0,279 0,177 0,171 0,967 0,167   CA Balance/GDP (%) 
N 13 12 14 14 14 14 14 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Referring to the below correlation table , we have excluded from the regression 
analysis GDP Growth Rate as its correlation is not significant and External 
Debt/GDP and Exports/GDP variables as their correlations are higher than 
75%. 
 
Table 6.17:  Results of the multiple regression analysis (for variables) for 
Slovenia 
 
Variables β SE β t Sig.  t
INFLATION RATE (% change) 
 -,495 ,159 -3,122 ,003 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) 
 ,184 ,384 ,478 ,646 
FX RESERVES/EXTERNAL DEBT (%) ,094 ,091 1,032 ,332 
CONSTANT -6,169 3,616 -1,706 ,126 
 
We added only the variables that have a significant t into the equation: 
Y = -6,169 -0,495* X2  
Y = CA (% of GDP) 
α = constant 
X2 = Inflation Rate Change (%) 
R2 is calculated as 0,577. The independent variables contribute the dependent 
variable with a percentage of 58,00%. This means that the independent 
variables are explaining the variation in the dependent variable by satisfactory 
level. To test the general significance, F-test is determined as 3,638. This value 
is smaller than the value in the F table. Thus, it is concluded that the equation is 
insignificant. 
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Table 6.18: Correlation Table for Slovenia 
 
    
GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
Inf. Rate   
(% 
change) 
Exports/  
GDP 
(%) 
Net FDI 
Inflows/GDP 
(%) 
External Debt/   
GDP (%) 
FX Reserves/   
External Debt 
(%) 
CA Balance/ 
GDP (%) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -0,379 -0,115 -0,064 -0,239 -0,124 -0,057 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,224 0,708 0,835 0,432 0,687 0,853 
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
N 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation -0,379 1 0,268 0,213 0,495 0,444 -,615* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,224   0,399 0,507 0,102 0,148 0,033 
Inf. Rate 
(% change) 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Pearson Correlation -0,115 0,268 1 0,402 ,877** 0,335 -0,455 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,708 0,399   0,154 0 0,263 0,102 
Exports/GDP 
(%) 
N 13 12 14 14 13 13 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,064 0,213 0,402 1 0,398 ,650* 0,032 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,835 0,507 0,154   0,178 0,016 0,913 
Net FDI 
Inflows/GDP 
 (%) N 13 12 14 14 13 13 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,239 0,495 ,877** 0,398 1 0,437 -0,412 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,432 0,102 0 0,178   0,135 0,162 
External 
Debt/GDP (%)
N 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation -0,124 0,444 0,335 ,650* 0,437 1 -0,096 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,687 0,148 0,263 0,016 0,135   0,756 
FX Reserves/ 
External Debt 
(%) N 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation -0,057 -,615* -0,455 0,032 -0,412 -0,096 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,853 0,033 0,102 0,913 0,162 0,756   
CA 
Balance/GDP 
(%) N 13 12 14 14 13 13 14 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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• TURKEY: 
 
Table 6.19: Tests of Normality for Turkey 
 
 
GROUP 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov(a) Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. 
Statist
ic df Sig. 
GDP GROWTH RATE 
(%) ,289 14 ,002 ,769 14 ,082 
INFLATION RATE  
(% change) 
 
,231 13 ,055 ,791 13 ,097 
CA (% of GDP) ,156 14 ,200(*) ,963 14 ,775 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 ,159 14 ,200(*) ,953 14 ,610 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP 
(%) ,331 14 0 ,644 14 ,069 
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP 
(%) 
 
,150 14 ,200(*) ,917 14 ,198 
FX RESERVES/ 
EXTERNAL DEBT (%) ,227 14   ,048 ,913 14 ,174 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
A Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Referring to the below correlation table, we have excluded from the regression 
analysis External Debt/GDP and Exports/GDP variables as their correlations 
are higher than 75%. 
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Table 6.20: Correlation Table for Turkey 
    
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
Inf. Rate   
(% change)
Exports/ 
GDP (%) 
Net FDI Inflows/ 
GDP (%) 
External 
Debt/GDP(%)
FX Reserves/External 
Debt (%) 
CA Balance/ 
GDP (%) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -0,455 -0,243 -0,105 -0,316 0,251 -,708
** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,118 0,402 0,722 0,271 0,386 0,005 
GDP Growth 
Rate (%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,455 1 -0,066 0,075 -0,124 -0,457 0,359 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,118   0,832 0,808 0,686 0,117 0,228 
Inf. Rate  
(% change) 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Pearson Correlation -0,243 -0,066 1 0,455 ,827
** ,623* 0,222 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,402 0,832   0,102 0 0,017 0,446 
Exports/GDP 
(%) 
N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,105 0,075 0,455 1 0,528 0,38 -0,095 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,722 0,808 0,102   0,052 0,18 0,748 
Net FDI 
Inflows/GDP 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -0,316 -0,124 ,827** 0,528 1 0,375 0,091 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,271 0,686 0 0,052   0,186 0,756 
External 
Debt/GDP 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0,251 -0,457 ,623* 0,38 0,375 1 -0,341 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,386 0,117 0,017 0,18 0,186   0,233 
FX Reserves/ 
External Debt 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
Pearson Correlation -,708** 0,359 0,222 -0,095 0,091 -0,341 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,005 0,228 0,446 0,748 0,756 0,233   
CA 
Balance/GDP 
(%) N 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.21: Results of the multiple regression analysis (for variables) for 
Turkey 
Variables β SE β t Sig.  t 
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) -,275 ,076 -3,624 ,004 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) -,479 ,568 -,844 ,417 
CONSTANT  ,034 ,633 ,054 ,958 
 
 
We added only the variables that have a significant t into the equation: 
Y = 0, 34 - 0,275* X1 
Y = CA (% of GDP) 
α = constant 
X1 = GDP Growth Rate (%) 
R2 is calculated as 0,548. The independent variables contribute the dependent 
variable with a percentage of 55,00%. This means that the independent 
variables are explaining the variation in the dependent variable by satisfactory 
level. To test the general significance, F-test is determined as 6,674. This value 
is bigger than the value in the F table. Thus, it is concluded that the equation is 
significant. 
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7. A COMPARISON OF COUNTRY FINDINGS 
 
In the constructed model, it has been found out that Russia’s independent 
variables has effects on the dependent variable with high percentage. Turkey, 
Romania and Slovenia’s independent variables have influence on the dependent 
variable by moderate level. Bulgaria and Czech Republic’s analyses results 
have denoted that the selected indicators do not affect significantly their CA 
balance/GDP ratio. Referring to Hungary’s regression analysis, we can 
conclude that there is not any statistically significant variables that influence 
CA balance/GDP ratio. Russia, Romania and Turkey’s regression equations 
have been found as meaningful while the other countries’ equations have been 
determined as unmeaningful.  
Table 7.1 reports that all the independent variables are not significant for all the 
selected countries but there are at least one variable for each country, except 
Hungary, that seem to be statistically significant. This indicates that CA 
Balance/GDP ratio can be used as a valid dependent variable to analyze the 
factors that have impacts on current account balance. Secondly, the results 
suggest that the external factors, which include openness to international 
finance, capital movements, exchange rate regime and external trade, behave 
differently in determining the current account balance in selected economies. 
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Table 7.1: Country Comparison of the independent variables 
 
  BULGARIA CZECH REP. HUNGARY ROMANIA RUSSIA SLOVENIA TURKEY 
LIST OF DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
               
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 
 insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant significant insignificant significant 
INFLATION RATE  
(% change) 
 insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant significant insignificant insignificant 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 
 insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant significant insignificant 
NET FDI INFLOWS/ 
GDP (%) 
 insignificant insignificant insignificant significant insignificant insignificant insignificant 
EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP (%) 
 
 significant insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant 
FX RESERVES/EXTERNAL 
DEBT (%) 
 insignificant significant insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this paper was to identify the factors that have impacts on 
current account balance of the seven selected European emerging economies. 
Yearly data from 1992 to 2005 was used in this study. The analysis was based 
on Milesi-Ferretti and Razin’s (1996) work which the countries that faced large 
and persistent current account deficits and identified the key factors that led 
them to crises 
Within the framework of the observations, the argument of this study is as 
follows: crises in emerging countries were not solely caused by large current 
account deficits, there were a variety of other factors such as GDP growth rate, 
inflation rate, FDI inflows, external debt, exports and FX reserves. Large 
deficits should be a cause for concern but this does not mean that every large 
deficit leads to a crisis; nor does it mean that only when there is a large current 
account deficit a crisis can take place. Most of the structural features and 
macroeconomic policy indicators of the selected countries’ improved in the 
non-crisis periods. 
The corresponding crisis indicator of current account balance depends on ad 
hoc situation of each national economy in terms of the extent to which the 
country’s economy is open to external trade, sustainability of current account 
imbalances. Economic growth should be maintained by a sustainable current 
account deficit in emerging countries and thus economic openness should be 
controlled by effective economic policies depending on each country’s 
economic structure in order to avoid vulnerabilities against external shocks. 
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APPENDICES: 
A. DATA RELATIVE TO CHAPTER 5 & 6 *: 
BULGARIA 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP (billion USD) 
 8,6 10,83 9,71 13,11 9,9 10,37 12,74 12,98 12,64 13,61 15,65 20,02 24,68 27,26 
GDP GROWTH RATE 
(%) -8,43 -11,63 -3,67 -1,6 -8,04 -5,84 4,12 2,28 5,4 4,1  4,5  5,0  6,6  6,2  
INFLATION RATE (%) 
 79,42 72,8 96 62,1 123 1061,21 23,67 3,72 6,69 6,68 4,37 1,77 5,13 3,76 
INFLATION RATE (%) 
CHANGE NA -6,62 23,20 -33,90 60,90 938,21 -1037,54 -19,95 2,97 -0,01 -2,31 -2,60 3,36 -1,37 
CA BALANCE 
 (% of GDP) -4,389 -24,69 -0,41 -0,2 0,16 4,12 -0,48 -5,03 -5,59 -5,63 -2,44 -5,51 -6,59 -12,40 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT (billion USD) 13,81 13,84 11,34 10,15 9,6 9,76 11,40 11,01 11,21 13,60 15,60 19,99 24,65 27,19 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 59,19 43,40 94,54 64,76 47,98 47,64 47,00 45,00 56,00 56,00 52,00 53,00 57,00 60,00 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP 
(%) 0,47 0,37 1,03 1,30 1,82 4,82 4,24 6,32 7,91 5,95 5,75 10,49 10,78 14,40 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT/GDP (%) 160,58 127,79 116,79 77,42 96,97 94,12 89,48 84,82 88,69 99,93 99,68 99,85 99,88 99,74 
FX RESERVES/TOTAL 
EXTERNAL DEBT (%) 6,15 4,41 8,29 11,43 4,38 21,11 22,89 26,25 28,10 24,19 28,27 31,47 35,62 29,57 
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CZECH REPUBLIC 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP (billion USD) 
 31,99 36,65 42,54 55,26 62,01 57,14 61,85 60,19 56,72 61,84 75,28 91,36 109,53 124,55 
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 -3,29 0,57 3,21 6,36 4,03 -0,73 -0,76 1,34 3,6  2,5  1,9  3,6  4,5  6,3  
INFLATION RATE (%) 
 11,12 20,84 9,97 9,16 8,79 8,59 9,7  1,8  3,9  4,5  1,4  -0,1 2,6  1,6  
INFLATION RATE (%) CHANGE 
 NA 9,72 -10,87 -0,81 -0,37 -0,20 1,11 -7,90 -4,00 0,60 -3,10 -1,50 2,50 -1,00 
CA BALANCE (% of GDP) 
 -0,16 1,24 -1,85 -2,49 -6,66 -6,34 2,12 -2,43 -4,74 -5,29 -5,66 -6,33 -5,25 -1,34 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT  
(billion USD) NA 9,6 12,21 17,19 21,18 21,62 12,78 11,47 24,30 21,30 24,60 23,80 28,00 36,28 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 51,39 52,61 48,99 50,74 48,94 52,08 54,22 55,46 63,37 65,35 60,22 61,78 70,15 72,21 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) 
 3,06 1,53 1,79 4,58 2,24 2,26 5,98 10,48 8,80 9,12 11,29 2,21 4,55 9,31 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP 
(%) NA 26,19 28,7 31,11 34,16 37,84 39,82 38,64 42,84 34,44 32,68 26,05 25,56 29,13 
FX RESERVES/TOTAL 
EXTERNAL DEBT (%) NA 39,38 50,29 80,51 58,31 45 51,5 56,04 60,25 64,1 87,32 76,73 62,47 63,14 
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HUNGARY 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP (billion USD) 
 37,25 38,6 41,51 44,67 45,16 45,72 47,05 48,04 47,94 53,30 66,62 84,44 102,19 110,44 
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 -3,06 -0,58 2,95 3,47 1,34 4,57 4,86 4,17 4,9  4,1  4,4  4,3  4,9  3,5  
INFLATION RATE (%) 
 22,95 22,45 18,87 28,3 23,6 18,28 14,23 10,00 9,80 9,22 5,27 4,64 6,78 3,55 
INFLATION RATE (%) 
CHANGE NA -0,50 -3,58 9,43 -4,70 -5,32 -4,05 -4,23 -0,20 -0,58 -3,96 -0,63 2,14 -3,23 
CA BALANCE (% of GDP) 
 21,4 24,6 28,5 31,7 27,6 25,3 27,62 29,51 27 29,6 31,5 31,5 42,38 57 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 
(billion USD) 0,95 -11,04 -9,77 -3,67 -3,91 -4,48 -7,23 -7,83 -8,37 -6,02 -6,98 -7,95 -8,42 -7,52 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 31,22 26,22 28,72 44,3 48,14 54,75 61,93 64,33 72,16 71,24 63,10 60,78 63,20 65,98 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) 
 3,97 6,06 2,75 10,75 7,29 9,08 7,10 6,89 5,78 7,39 4,52 2,58 4,42 6,91 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT/GDP (%) 57,45 63,73 68,66 70,96 61,12 55,34 58,70 61,43 56,32 55,53 47,28 37,30 41,47 51,61 
FX RESERVES/TOTAL 
EXTERNAL DEBT (%) 20,33 26,91 23,33 37,51 34,93 32,92 33,45 37,11 41,44 36,25 32,86 40,48 37,56 32,54 
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ROMANIA 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP (billion USD) 
 19,58 26,36 30,07 35,48 35,32 35,29 42,11 35,73 37,06 40,19 45,83 59,51 75,52 98,91 
GDP GROWTH RATE 
(%) -8,77 1,53 3,93 7,14 3,95 -6,05 -4,82 -1,15 2,4  5,7  5,1  5,2  8,5  4,2  
INFLATION RATE (%) 
 210,39 256,11 136,74 32,27 38,8 154,76 59,10 45,80 45,67 34,47 22,54 15,27 11,88 9,03 
INFLATION RATE (%) 
CHANGE NA 45,72 -119,37 -104,47 6,53 115,96 -95,66 -13,29 -0,14 -11,20 -11,93 -7,26 -3,39 -2,86 
CA BALANCE  
(% of GDP) -7,75 -4,7 -1,72 -4,47 -6,65 -5,4 -7,10 -4,12 -3,70 -5,49 -3,33 -5,82 -8,36 -8,88 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT (billion USD) 3,28 4,28 5,6 6,83 8,45 9,64 10,10 9,00 11,10 12,65 16,70 22,63 29,57 38,86 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 26,92 22,23 24,11 26,63 27,15 28,19 22,62 28,02 32,87 33,31 35,44 34,71 35,93 32,92 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP 
(%) 0,36 0,38 1,16 1,18 0,74 3,46 4,82 2,91 2,81 2,89 2,49 3,09 8,63 6,55 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT/GDP (%) 16,75 16,24 18,62 19,25 23,92 27,32 23,98 25,19 29,95 31,48 36,44 38,03 39,16 39,29 
FX RESERVES/TOTAL 
EXTERNAL DEBT (%) 25 23,13 36,25 22,25 24,73 38,38 28,42 17,00 22,25 30,99 36,71 35,53 49,44 51,13 
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RUSSIA 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP (billion USD) 
 85,59 183,82 276,9 313,45 391,78 404,95 270,95 195,91 259,70 306,58 345,49 431,43 591,90 764,26 
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 NA -8,7 -12,7 -4,1 -3,6 1,4 -5,30 6,40 10,00 5,10 4,70 7,30 7,20 6,40 
INFLATION RATE (%) 
 NA 874,62 307,63 131,3 47,74 14,77 27,68 85,74 20,78 21,46 15,78 13,67 10,89 12,68 
INFLATION RATE (%) 
CHANGE NA NA -566,99 -176,33 -83,56 -32,97 12,91 58,07 -64,97 0,68 -5,68 -2,12 -2,78 1,80 
CA BALANCE (% of GDP) 
 -1,4 1,41 2,83 2,22 2,77 -0,02 0,08 12,57 18,04 11,07 8,44 8,21 10,06 11,05 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 
(billion USD) 78,21 111,96 121,77 121,4 126,37 127,58 188,40 178,20 160,00 146,30 152,30 186,00 213,50 257,20 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 377,37 100,58 43,24 37,30 26,09 24,73 31,22 43,22 44,06 36,89 35,21 35,16 34,38 35,18 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP 
(%) 1,36 0,66 0,25 0,66 0,66 1,20 1,02 1,69 1,04 0,90 1,00 1,85 2,61 1,69 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT/GDP (%) 91,38 60,91 43,98 38,73 32,26 31,51 69,53 90,96 61,61 47,72 44,08 43,11 36,07 33,65 
FX RESERVES/TOTAL 
EXTERNAL DEBT (%) NA 5,21 3,27 11,75 8,92 10,01 4,14 4,75 15,16 22,24 28,92 39,34 56,59 68,39 
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SLOVENIA 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP (billion USD) 
 18,79 16,21 16,43 20,86 21,02 20,31 21,59 22,16 19,89 20,39 23,07 29,06 33,72 35,69 
GDP GROWTH RATE 
(%) N/A 2,8 5,3 4,1 3,6 4,91 3,567 5,366 4,4  2,8  4,0  2,8  4,3  4,5  
INFLATION RATE 
(%) N/A 31,93 20,75 13,66 9,88 8,36 7,9  6,1  8,9  8,6  7,5  5,7  3,7  2,5  
INFLATION RATE 
(%) CHANGE NA NA -11,18 -7,09 -3,78 -1,52 -0,46 -1,80 2,80 -0,30  -1,10  -1,80 -2,00 -1,20 
CA BALANCE (% of 
GDP) 5,79 1,74 4,26 -1,48 0,27 0,32 -0,721 -3,952 -3,155 0,184 1,069 -0,779 -2,658 
-
1,734 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT (billion USD) N/A 3,8 4,55 5,48 6,67 6,81 7,57 8,03 8,82 9,18 11,93 16,7 20,9 24,19 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 42,2 46,02 52,65 49,71 50,19 51,6 51,44 47,55 53,95 55,48 55,24 53,97 58 62,22 
NET FDI 
INFLOWS/GDP (%) 0,59 0,68 0,73 0,72 0,81 1,62 1,02 0,5 0,7 2,45 7,2 1,03 2,46 1,51 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT/GDP (%) N/A 23,44 27,69 26,27 31,73 33,53 35,06 36,24 44,34 45,02 51,71 57,47 61,98 67,78 
FXRESERVES/TOTAL 
EXTERNAL DEBT(%) N/A 20,26 32,53 32,85 34,18 48,46 47,16 39,48 36,28 47,17 58,51 50,9 42,06 33,4 
 
 
 
 
  
 
90
TURKEY 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP (billion USD) 
 213,58 242,14 174,45 227,51 243,9 255,07 269,00 250,48 267,19 196,44 232,94 304,14 392,99 483,92 
GDP GROWTH RATE (%) 
 5,98 8,04 -5,46 7,19 7,01 7,53 3,09 -3,37 6,8 -5,7 6,2 5,3 9,4 8,4 
INFLATION RATE (%) 
 71,95 65,25 104,29 89,57 80,24 85,65 84,72 64,87 55,04 54,25 45,13 25,34 8,60 8,18 
INFLATION RATE (%) 
CHANGE NA -6,70 39,04 -14,72 -9,33 5,41 -0,93 -19,85 -9,84 -0,79 -9,11 -19,80 -16,74 -0,42 
CA BALANCE (% of GDP) 
 -0,46 -3,21 0,29 -2,38 -0,99 -1,03 0,80 -0,37 -3,72 1,92 -0,27 -2,48 -3,68 -4,59 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 
(billion USD) 56,55 68,6 66,25 73,78 79,83 84,72 96,30 103,10 118,60 113,60 129,70 144,30 160,80 168,70 
EXPORTS/GDP (%) 
 12,63 12,01 18,85 17,44 18,88 21,56 21,34 19,44 20,10 27,44 25,22 22,99 23,55 21,86 
NET FDI INFLOWS/GDP (%) 
 0,39 0,26 0,35 0,39 0,30 0,32 0,35 0,31 0,05 1,90 0,49 0,58 0,68 2,51 
TOTAL EXTERNAL 
DEBT/GDP (%) 26,48 28,33 37,98 32,43 32,73 33,21 35,80 41,16 55,94 75,52 55,68 47,45 54,32 48,54 
FX RESERVES/TOTAL 
EXTERNAL DEBT (%) 10,82 9,08 10,75 16,79 20,53 21,97 20,19 22,65 21,18 16,63 20,87 23,56 22,39 28,62 
 
*All data are taken from the IMF International Statistics, World Economic Outlook databases and central banks statistics. The dataset 
consist of annual observations from 1992 to 2005 for 7 European emerging market economies (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and Turkey).
